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TOWARDS A RELATIONAL 
CONCEPTUALIZATION OF THE RIGHT 
TO PERSONAL AUTONOMY 
YAEL BRAUDO-BAHAT* 
ABSTRACT  
This Article lays the foundation for a relational conceptualization of the 
right to personal autonomy, where personal autonomy is perceived as a 
fluid and dynamic competency, which evolves and flourishes through one’s 
web of relationships.  On its face, the more common, liberal conception of 
personal autonomy seems more fitting for the articulation of the right to 
personal autonomy, as most Western legal systems are based on liberal 
grounds.  Indeed, several liberal legal scholars have addressed the right to 
personal autonomy and the state’s duty to promote it.  Nonetheless, I show 
that the liberal conception of autonomy is limited in its ability to serve 
usefully as a basis for the right to personal autonomy, for several reasons.  
Most notably, as feminist and communitarian critics have highlighted, the 
liberal conception of personal autonomy is mostly based on an inaccurate 
perception of persons and autonomy. As shown in this Article, the 
relational conception of autonomy provides a more complex and accurate 
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account of personal autonomy, and thus can serve as a better basis for 
developing the legal right to personal autonomy.  Throughout the Article, I 
analyze the conditions needed for the development of personal autonomy 
and define the right to personal autonomy, as well as the role of the state in 
promoting it.  Besides ensuring the availability of a satisfactory variety of 
options (a condition that has been developed by liberal scholars and 
embraced by relational ones), the state’s responsibility also includes 
ensuring the availability of constructive relationships through which one’s 
personal autonomy can thrive. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In liberal societies, personal autonomy is considered essential for one’s 
ability to lead a meaningful life.  Although it has not been officially 
recognized in most Western legal systems as a legal right (Israel being an 
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exception in this regard
1
), its significance is often mentioned in cases and 
legal scholarship.  Moreover, some liberal legal scholars advocate the 
recognition of personal autonomy as a legal right.  Joseph Raz, for 
example, recognizes autonomy as an “ultimate value”
2
 and discusses the 
state’s ability to promote the personal autonomy of members of the 
society.
3
  Although Raz seems reluctant to recognize personal autonomy as 
a legal right per se,
4
 Jeremy Waldron shows that Raz does address a state’s 
duty to promote its citizens’ autonomy.
5
  More explicitly, Hanoch Dagan 
addresses a state’s responsibility for actively promoting its citizens’ 
personal autonomy by providing institutional pluralism.
6
 
Despite the apparent centrality of personal autonomy and the emerging 
recognition of the right to autonomy, and while the liberal conception does 
provide a preliminary basis for developing the right to personal autonomy,
7
 
I argue in this Article that the liberal conception of personal autonomy is 
insufficient for this task, for several reasons.  First, the liberal conception 
emphasizes a person’s individuality and independence, and portrays 
autonomy as an internal and isolated process.
8
  Thus, the liberal conception 
makes it rather difficult to define the role of others, including the state, in 
actively promoting one’s personal autonomy.  Second, the individualistic 
focus leads to an imprecise conceptualization of personhood and personal 
autonomy, as in reality persons are not isolated from each other but rather 
                                                          
 1.  See infra notes 56-58 and accompanying text. 
 2.  JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 205 (1986). 
 3.  Id. at 265, 428. The term “state” in this Article refers generally to a state’s 
official authorities (such as legislators, courts, executive authorities, policymakers, 
etc.). In addition, I use the terms “members of the society” and “citizens” 
interchangeably, but intentionally abstain from defining their scope. The question 
regarding to whom a state is obliged is substantial but exceeds the goals of this Article, 
which merely focuses on the definition of a specific right. 
 4.  Id. at 247 (arguing that acknowledging the right to personal autonomy requires 
placing a heavy burden on private persons and not only on the state). 
 5.  See Jeremy Waldron, Autonomy and Perfectionism in Raz’s Morality of 
Freedom, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1097, 1123-24 (1988); see also Nicole Hassoun, Raz on 
the Right to Autonomy, 22 EUR. J. PHIL. 69 (2011). 
 6.  Hanoch Dagan, Pluralism and Perfectionism in Private Law, 112 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1409, 1424 (2012) (“An autonomy-based pluralism must take seriously the state’s 
obligation to provide a sufficiently diverse set of robust legal frameworks for people to 
organize their lives.”). 
 7.  Mostly, the liberal conceptualization of the right to personal autonomy focuses 
on state’s responsibility to expand the variety of one’s options, thus promoting her 
autonomy. See, e.g., RAZ, supra note 2, at 205; Dagan, supra note 6, at 1424; see also 
infra Section I.C. 
 8.  For further explanation of the critique on the liberal conception of autonomy, 
see infra Part II. 
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are embedded within networks of relations and relationships.
9
  Basing the 
conceptualization of the right to personal autonomy on a partial conception 
of personhood and autonomy might infringe autonomy instead of 
promoting it. 
A more adequate conceptualization of the right to personal autonomy 
can be provided by the relational account of personal autonomy.
10
  As 
thoroughly discussed throughout this Article, although the relational-
autonomy scholars have criticized the liberal conception of personal 
autonomy, they have not negated the mere significance of personal 
autonomy. Rather, they developed an alternative conceptualization of 
personal autonomy — one that highlights the social interactions and 
relationships through which one’s autonomy evolves and develops.  While 
many liberal scholars conceptualize autonomy as a strictly rational and 
internal process of considering one’s options and reflecting upon one’s 
preferences,
11
 relational scholars conceptualize it as a more dynamic 
process.  Most persons develop their autonomy and reach autonomous 
decisions by learning from and consulting others.  Moreover, persons’ 
emotions and embodiedness (and not just their rationality and reason) 
influence their decisions, preferences and choices.  Nevertheless, 
conceptualizing persons as inherently relational does not contradict their 
individuality.  On the contrary, the relational conception characterizes 
persons as both constantly embedded within relationships and distinct from 
each other; as both independent and interdependent; as both rational and 
embodied.  In other words, personal autonomy in its relational 
conceptualization is best conceived as a synergy between the individuality 
and the interconnectedness of persons and personhood.  I argue that the 
conceived synergy should serve as the basis for the articulation of the right 
to personal autonomy. 
Moreover, the relational scholarship views the state as a major actor with 
which a person interacts, i.e., it considers the relationship with the state as a 
substantial relationship within which one’s personal autonomy is 
                                                          
 9.  The individualistic focus as well is discussed infra Part II. 
 10.  To mention but a fraction of the prominent scholarship on relational autonomy: 
AUTONOMY, OPPRESSION, AND GENDER (Andrea Veltman & Mark Piper eds., 2014); 
FEMINISTS RETHINK THE SELF (Diana T. Meyers ed., 1997); RELATIONAL AUTONOMY 
(Catriona Mackenzie & Natalie Stoljar eds., 2000); MARILYN FRIEDMAN, AUTONOMY, 
GENDER, POLITICS (2003); DIANA T. MEYERS, SELF, SOCIETY, AND PERSONAL CHOICE 
(1989); JENNIFER NEDELSKY, LAW’S RELATIONS (2011); John Christman, Relational 
Autonomy, Liberal Individualism, and the Social Constitution of Selves, 117 PHIL. 
STUD. 143 (2004). 
 11.  See, e.g., GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY 12 
(1988); Harry G. Frankfurt, Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person, 68 J. 
PHIL. 5, 20 (1971). 
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developed.  The substantial relationship affords a stronger foundation for 
the role of the state in promoting personal autonomy than the one provided 
by the liberal conception.  However, since most of the scholarship on 
relational autonomy is philosophical, it rarely deals with public policy.  
Consequently, it has not yet directly addressed personal autonomy as a 
legal right.  Although legal scholar Jennifer Nedelsky draws a connection 
between relational autonomy and legal discourse in her groundbreaking 
book Law’s Relations,
12
 she does not explicitly develop the right to 
personal autonomy.  My aim in this Article, therefore, is to re-
conceptualize the legal right to personal autonomy and state’s 
responsibility to promote it, based on the theoretical literature on relational 
autonomy.  The Article proceeds as follows.  In Part I, I briefly discuss the 
liberal conception of personal autonomy and the definition it provides for 
the state’s role in promoting it.  Part II addresses the limits of the liberal 
conception of personal autonomy, mainly by discussing its feminist 
critiques.  Part III explores the relational conception of personal autonomy, 
as developed in the literature thus far.  Part IV introduces the preliminary 
relational conceptualization of the right to personal autonomy and of the 
state’s role in promoting it.  The last Part concludes by pointing to the need 
for further development of the relational conceptualization of the right to 
personal autonomy in various legal contexts. 
II. THE LIBERAL CONCEPTION OF PERSONAL AUTONOMY 
A. Personal Autonomy in a Nutshell 
Liberal scholarship defines personal autonomy as the ability of a person 
to be the author of her own life, determine her “self-law,”
13
 and make her 
own choices.  The autonomous ideal, according to Raz, is a person’s 
control over her own destiny, by an ongoing series of choices throughout 
her life.
14
  Such choices may be anecdotal or substantial, and either short- 
or long-term.
15
  Philosopher Harry Frankfurt adds to the definition the 
consistency and coherency of such choices with a person’s values, identity 
                                                          
 12.  NEDELSKY, supra note 10 (uncovering the inherent limits of the liberal 
conceptualization of autonomy and rights in legal discourse and advocating their 
reconceptualization in relational terms); see also Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Reproductive 
Choices and Informed Consent: Fetal Interests, Women’s Identity, and Relational 
Autonomy, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. 567 (2011). 
 13.  DWORKIN, supra note 11, at 12. “Self-law” the literal meaning of “autonomy”: 
auto=self; nomy=law. Note that this Article focuses on personal autonomy rather than 
moral autonomy. 
 14.  RAZ, supra note 2, at 369. 
 15.  Waldron, supra note 5. 
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and morality.
16
  Personal autonomy, in other words, relates to the ability to 
live according to a self-made life-plan while making concrete choices that 
conform with it. 
In order to lead an autonomous life, a person’s considerations, volitions, 
and preferences should be authentic, i.e., should be the product of her free 
will rather than formed by coercion or manipulation.
17
  As we shall see, 
there is no need for one’s choices to be “clean” of external social 
influences, but they should be consciously and actively formulated, 
examined and chosen by the person herself.  Choices that a person is 
coerced into making are not authentic and therefore not autonomous.
18
  
Similarly, choices that are the result of manipulation are not autonomous 
either.
19
  At the basis of the conceptualization of autonomy lies the rational 
and reasonable individual agent.  The agent is able to consider the possible 
consequences of her choices and verify the coherence between her choices 
and her preferences, as well as between her choices and her life-plan.
20
  Her 
rationality and reason enable the agent to distinguish herself from others, 
develop her independent opinions and unique character, and be enterprising 
and innovative.
21




Liberal scholars also address the personal relations and social 
connections that influence one’s autonomy.  Philosopher Gerald Dworkin, 
for example, discusses such influences on one’s choices and preferences.  
Rational choice, according to Dworkin, includes, inter alia, the norms, 
values and rules that are learned and acquired from one’s social 
environment.
23
  Although the agent cannot control these norms and values, 
they do not infringe one’s autonomy.  On the contrary, autonomy should be 
realistic and viable, and if a condition for autonomy were to be a complete 
independence of one’s choices from her social environment, it could not be 
                                                          
 16.  Frankfurt, supra note 11. 
 17.  On authenticity, see John Christman, Autonomy in Moral and Political 
Philosophy, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 
2011), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/autonomy-moral/.  
 18.  RAZ, supra note 2, at 150-57. 
 19.  Id. at 377-78. Manipulation is the use of tactics aimed at changing one’s 
preferences and making her choose options that she otherwise would not have chosen. 
 20.  JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 47-53 (1992). 
 21.  JOHN S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 17-18 (2d ed. 1863). 
 22.  Thomas C. Heller & David E. Wellbery, Introduction, in RECONSTRUCTING 
INDIVIDUALISM: AUTONOMY, INDIVIDUALITY, AND THE SELF IN WESTERN THOUGHT 1, 
1-2 (Thomas C. Heller, David E. Wellbery & Morton Sosna eds., 1986). 
 23.  DWORKIN, supra note 11, at 12. 
6
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achieved.
24
  Moreover, according to Dworkin, autonomy, having a central 
personal value, should be consistent with other substantial values, such as 
loyalty, commitment and love.
25
  Dworkin therefore contends that 




Raz also refers to the connection between personal autonomy and one’s 
relationships.  He argues that in order to be autonomous, one needs be able 
to develop relationships and constitute long-term projects and 
commitments.
27
  For those projects and commitments to be successful and 
meaningful, they should conform to social norms.
28
  Of course, one can 
reject some of those norms, but in order to succeed it is crucial that at least 
some personal goals conform to them; otherwise, the person might 
constantly fail to achieve her goals.  Such failures might lead to the 
infringement of her personal welfare and autonomy.  Since social norms 
influence one’s relationships, choices, goals and commitments, and all of 
those influence her autonomy,
29
 Raz concludes, the ideal of personal 
autonomy does not resonate with extreme individualism.
30
 
B. The Conditions for Personal Autonomy: The Procedural Account of 
Autonomy 
Some liberal scholars have articulated the conditions that are required for 
leading autonomous lives and making autonomous decisions.  This branch 
of scholarship is referred to as the procedural account of autonomy.
31
  
According to this account of autonomy, autonomous decisions should be 
made through a process of internal consideration of a person’s desires and 
preferences.  The internal consideration process is known as “critical 
reflection,” and it includes the examination of the preferences, as well as 
the way in which they have been formed, their advantages and their costs. 
The ability to critically consider the preferences, their sources and 
consequences makes a person autonomous.  Such a process is required for 
concrete choices, as well as for determining one’s long-term life-plan.
32
  
When conducted rationally and reasonably, critical reflection enables a 
                                                          
 24.  Id. at 7. 
 25.  Id. at 12. 
 26.  Id. at 21-23. 
 27.  RAZ, supra note 2, at 154, 383. 
 28.  Id. at 308. 
 29.  Id. at 350. 
 30.  Id. at 205-06. 
 31.  See DWORKIN, supra note 11; Frankfurt, supra note 11. 
 32.  DWORKIN, supra note 11, at 7-12, 17. 
7
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person to distinguish between her immediate desires and her volitions.
33
 
Critically reflecting on them enables the development of one’s authentic 
preferences and ultimately results in rational and autonomous decisions.
34
 
Critical reflection also enables the formation of a variety of options from 
which one can choose the most preferable.  Raz argues that a person cannot 
be autonomous and make autonomous choices unless she has an adequate 
variety of options.
35
  Those options can be short- or long-term,
36
 and they 
should be sufficiently distinct from one another.
37
  Like autonomy in 
general, those options too are influenced by a person’s social environment 
and one’s commitments to others.
38
  Moreover, Raz emphasizes that in 
order to be autonomous, a person must be aware of the existing options: the 
mere existence of options is not enough.
39
  Unawareness can stem from 
ignorance or from blindness to existing options.
40
  The lack of an adequate 
variety of options, either objectively or subjectively, infringes one’s ability 
to lead an autonomous life. 
For one to adequately conduct a process of critical reflection and form 
her variety of options, she needs to be competent.  Such competency is 
defined in liberal scholarship as a cognitive capacity that enables a person 
to identify her options, create new ones, critically consider them, and 
eventually choose and execute the preferable one.
41
  In this context, as well, 
a person’s rationality and reason are considered the main qualities that 
enable a person to be aware of her desires, volitions and preferences and to 
distinguish between them, i.e., they are central and crucial for the ability to 
                                                          
 33.  For further discussion on the differences between first-order desires and 
second-order volitions, see Frankfurt, supra note 11.  
 34.  DWORKIN, supra note 11, at 20. 
 35.  RAZ, supra note 2, at 204, 273. It bears mention that too wide a variety of 
options might make the choice between them rather difficult and thus infringe 
autonomy instead of enhancing it. See BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE PARADOX OF CHOICE: 
WHY MORE IS LESS (2004); Hanoch Dagan, The Utopian Promise of Private Law, 66 
U. TORONTO L.J. 392, 412 n.66 (2016); Maytal Gilboa & Omer Y. Pelled, Optimizing 
Autonomy in the Law (July 31, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) 
(arguing that expanding one’s options also creates substantial costs, such as mental 
costs of making a decision, costs of regretting one’s choice after it has been made, 
information costs, and risk-of-error costs). It is extremely difficult to explain what is 
considered too wide a variety, and I therefore leave it outside the scope of the current 
Article. 
 36.  RAZ, supra note 2, at 374. 
 37.  Id. at 375. 
 38.  Id. at 154, 383. 
 39.  Id. at 371 (“To choose one must be aware of one’s options.”). 
 40.  Id. at 382 (referring to such blindness as “self-deception”). 
 41.  See MILL, supra note 21; RAZ, supra note 2, at 343-71. 
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In addition, both critical reflection and the formation of a variety of 
options should be independent of coercion and manipulation.  Some 
authors refer to such independence as “procedural independence.”
43
 
According to Raz, coercion narrows the variety of options, since some 
options become unavailable.
44
  Coercion also infringes the process of 
critical reflection, since even if one has several options the coercion 
substantially subverts her preferences and choices.
45
  Similarly, 
manipulation infringes procedural independence, as it leads a person to 




C. The State’s Responsibility Under the Liberal Conception of Personal 
Autonomy 
The conditions discussed in the previous Section provide a preliminary 
basis for developing the legal right to personal autonomy and defining the 
state’s duty to promote it.  Indeed, some liberal legal scholars have 
addressed several aspects of those right and duty, focusing mainly on the 
responsibility of the state and other actors to expand a person’s variety of 
options.
47
  Raz, for example, demonstrates the state’s responsibility for 
expanding citizens’ variety of options by advocating the recognition of gay 
marriage.  He argues that when states avoid such recognition they prevent 
gay people from enjoying the benefits of marriage as a legally and socially 
recognized institution.  This narrows their variety of options and infringes 
their personal autonomy.
48
  Interestingly, when recently holding that 
preventing gay marriage is unconstitutional, the U.S. Supreme Court 
related as well to the need to enhance gay couples’ autonomy by providing 
them with the ability to choose to marry (along with other options for 
                                                          
 42.  Frankfurt, supra note 11, at 11-12. 
 43.  See DWORKIN supra note 11; RAZ, supra note 2, at 377-78. 
 44.  See RAZ, supra note 2, at 377; see also Harry Frankfurt, Alternate Possibilities 
and Moral Responsibility, 66 J. PHIL. 829, 830-31 (1969). 
 45.  The most obvious example is the choice to give in to a robber’s demands in 
order to save one’s life.  
 46.  See RAZ, supra note 2, at 377; see also Irving Thalberg, Hierarchical Analyses 
of Unfree Action, 8 CAN. J. PHIL. 211, 217 (1978). 
 47.  See generally Waldron, supra note 5, at 1120-22. 
 48.  See RAZ, supra note 2, at 205-07; see also Shahar Lifshitz, The Pluralistic 
Vision of Marriage, in MARRIAGE AT THE CROSSROADS: LAW, POLICY, AND THE BRAVE 
NEW WORLD OF TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY FAMILIES 260 (Elizabeth Scott & Marsha 
Garrison eds., 2012) (regarding the need for institutional pluralism with regard to 
regulating and formulating spousal relationships). 
9
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formalizing their relationships), thus expanding their variety of options.
49
 
Dagan addresses another aspect of the state’s responsibility for 
expanding persons’ variety of options by focusing on institutional pluralism 
with regard to contracts and property.
50
  According to Dagan, the state has 
to provide its citizens with a variety of legal institutions that enable them to 
choose their preferable and suitable ways for designing their relationships 
with others.  A monistic approach to contracts and property narrows those 
options, infringes citizens’ autonomy, and might lead to an inadequate 
formation of contractual and property relationships.  Dagan therefore 
advocates an institutional pluralism in both legal branches and casts this 
responsibility on the state.  In a recent article, Dagan and Avihay Dorfman 
develop the notion of relational justice and expand the active responsibility 
of promoting personal autonomy from the state to other persons as well.
51
  
Mainly, they focus on the duty of persons to accommodate each other’s 
choices (though not in an unlimited manner
52
).  State’s responsibility in this 
regard is to formulate the legal schemes that cast such horizontal duties and 
to enforce them. 
Another significant example of promoting the right to personal 
autonomy lies within the doctrine of informed consent.
53
  In a nutshell, this 
doctrine aims at promoting one’s autonomy by requiring hospitals and 
physicians to disclose the information on one’s medical condition and the 
various available treatment options.  Disclosure enables her to 
autonomously choose the treatment she prefers.
54
  When harm is caused by 
medical treatment that has not been consented to, the injured individual is 
entitled to compensation even if the physician and hospital were not 
negligent.
55
  The Israeli Supreme Court has further developed the informed 
consent doctrine and determined that the absence of informed consent in 
                                                          
 49.  Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015) (Kennedy, J.). 
 50.  See Hanoch Dagan, Autonomy, Pluralism, and Contract Law Theory, 76 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 19 (2013); Dagan, supra note 6. 
 51.  Hanoch Dagan & Avihay Dorfman, Just Relationships, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 
1395 (2016). 
 52.  Id. at 1422-24. 
 53.  For a discussion on the connection between informed consent and personal 
autonomy, see RUTH FADEN & TOM BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF 
INFORMED CONSENT 235 (1986). The example of informed consent will also be referred 
to in a further part of this Article. See infra Section IV.B. It should nevertheless be 
emphasized that informed consent serves in this Article as a mere example, and is 
therefore not thoroughly developed and discussed.  
 54.  One of the American landmark cases in this context is Canterbury v. 
Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1972).  
 55.  PAUL S. APPELBAUM, CHARLES W. LIDZ & ALAN MEISEL, INFORMED CONSENT: 
LEGAL THEORY AND CLINICAL PRACTICE 13-14 (1987). 
10
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and of itself constitutes a compensable tortious wrongdoing — even when 
no physical damage was caused, and even when it can be proven that the 
patient would have chosen the same treatment if her informed consent had 
been obtained.
56
  The Court based its ruling on the acknowledgement of the 
right to personal autonomy, infringement of which is compensable.
57
  As 
far as I know, Israel is the only legal system that has thus far officially 
established the right to personal autonomy in the informed consent 
context,
58
 but nonetheless, informed consent is considered a prominent 
doctrine in most Western legal systems.  It can therefore be argued that 
most legal systems acknowledge, albeit unofficially and indirectly, some 
form of the right to personal autonomy. 
The examples discussed above highlight two major ways in which the 
state can and should actively promote personal autonomy: direct and 
indirect.  As regards institutional pluralism, the responsibility to promote 
personal autonomy is cast directly upon the state: it should provide an 
adequate variety of legal options to regulate spousal, contractual and 
property relations.  As regards relational justice and informed consent, the 
duty falls upon private people and upon private (or semi-private) 
institutions.  The duty of the state in the latter cases is to define the 
personal and institutional duties and enforce them.  Whether casting a 
direct or indirect duty upon the state, the liberal conception of personal 
autonomy can serve as a preliminary basis for the articulation of the legal 
right to personal autonomy. 
Nevertheless, the liberal articulation of this right is insufficient, since it 
focuses mostly (and almost exclusively) on the variety of available options, 
and on the state’s and others’ responsibility to expand it.  The variety of 
options is, of course, crucial for autonomy, as one cannot act autonomously 
when lacking adequate options, but it is not enough: other conditions — 
namely conducting critical reflection processes and developing a 
competency for autonomy — are also needed.  However, under the liberal 
conception of personal autonomy it is rather difficult to conceptualize and 
define the state’s (or others’) duty to promote the other conditions of 
autonomy: those conditions are considered internal and independent, and 
thus the involvement of the state (or others) in such processes can be 
                                                          
 56.  See CA 2781/93 Daka v. Carmel Hosp. 53(4) PD 526 (1996) (Isr.); Assaf 
Yaakov, The Daka Case: The Metamorphosis of the Right to Autonomy, 52 MISHAPTIM 
[HEBREW U. L. REV.] 5 (2012) (Isr.). 
 57.  The right to personal autonomy has gradually been expanded in Israeli legal 
discourse to non-medical cases as well. See, e.g., CA 1138/97 Tnuva v. Rabi 57(4) PD 
673 (2003) (Isr.) (ruling that withholding information on adding silicone to drinking 
milk infringes peoples’ autonomy to choose whether or not to consume the milk). 
 58.  See Yaakov, supra note 56, at 5, 81. 
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understood as manipulation or even coercion.  This limitation of the liberal 
conception of personal autonomy is discussed in the next Part. 
III. THE LIMITS OF THE LIBERAL CONCEPTION 
A. The Dominance of Individualism 
Many critiques have been voiced against the individualistic nature of 
personal autonomy, as constructed in liberal scholarship.
59
  Some of them 
are specifically directed at the conceptualization of the autonomous process 
as an internal, Cartesian process: the person is usually perceived, according 
to the critics, as an inner citadel, in which the process takes place.
60
  The 
problem with such conceptualization is twofold.  First, it limits the ability 
to articulate state’s (and others’) duty to actively promote personal 
autonomy, since such involvement might be perceived as coercion and 
manipulation, as mentioned above.  Second, it conveys a partial and 
inaccurate image of personhood and autonomy.  In reality, a major part of 
one’s choices and preferences evolve and take form through discussion of 
them with others, consultation with others, and more broadly — interaction 
with others.
61
  An inaccurate conception of personhood and personal 
autonomy, as Nedelsky warns us, leads to an inaccurate conceptualization 
of legal rights.
62
  Most notably, it might lead to an inaccurate 
conceptualization of the legal right to personal autonomy.   
Alongside the critiques on the individualistic nature of the autonomous 
process, some feminist critiques also focus on the separation between 
autonomy, dependence and care. Philosopher Loraine Code points out that 
interdependence, which is inherent to interpersonal relationships, is 
conceived by many liberal scholars as a threat to personal autonomy.
63
  
                                                          
 59.  Such critiques have been voiced by communitarian scholars, such as MICHAEL 
SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982), and CHARLES TAYLOR, What 
Is Human Agency, in 1 PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS: HUMAN AGENCY AND LANGUAGE 15 
(1985). They are also found in scholarship on identity politics, see, e.g., IRIS MARION 
YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE (1990), as well as in feminist 
scholarship, see, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 10 (providing an overview of feminist 
critiques); Marilyn Friedman, Autonomy and Social Relationships: Rethinking the 
Feminist Critique, in FEMINISTS RETHINK THE SELF, supra note 10, at 40 (same). The 
discussion in this Article focuses mainly on the feminist critiques. 
 60.  Annette C. Baier, Cartesian Persons, 10 PHILOSOPIA 169 (1981); Marina A.L. 
Oshana, Personal Autonomy and Society, 29 J. SOC. PHIL. 81 (1998); Natalie Stoljar, 
Informed Consent and Relational Conceptions of Autonomy, 36 J. MED. & PHIL. 375 
(2011). 
 61.  NEDELSKY, supra note 10, at 59-60; Stoljar, supra note 60.  
 62.  NEDELSKY, supra note 10, at 38. 
 63.  LORRAINE CODE, WHAT CAN SHE KNOW? FEMINIST THEORY AND THE 
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Nedelsky shows as well that in Western culture a person is considered 
autonomous if she is free from collective and community constraints.
64
  
However, as Nedelsky argues, no person is completely independent from 
others, and more importantly, the development of personal autonomy stems 
from — and occurs within — the dependency of people on one another.
65
  
Philosopher John Christman makes a similar contention, arguing that each 
person is inherently dependent on other persons, institutions, social groups, 
social norms, etc., and that consequently the development of one’s personal 
autonomy depends on all of those.
66
  In other words, conceiving 
autonomous persons as inherently independent and disconnected from each 
other leads to a misconception of personhood and personal autonomy, and 




Another strand of critiques focuses on the abstractness of the 
autonomous person.  As a part of the internal, individualistic 
conceptualization of the autonomous person, liberal scholarship 
emphasizes the person’s rationality and reason, while ignoring physical and 
emotional aspects.  The abstract person lacks any characteristics that 
distinguish her from other persons, such as color, sex, gender, physical 
disabilities, emotions and feelings; and ignorance of physical or emotional 
aspects serves as the basis for the liberal conceptualization of equality and 
rights.
68
  However, as feminist scholars argue, this abstract image of 
persons and personhood actually leans on the image of white men.
69
  
Consequently, women and other social minorities that are identified with 
                                                          
CONSTRUCTION OF KNOWLEDGE 79 (1991); Lorraine Code, The Perversion of 
Autonomy and the Subjection of Women: Discourses of Social Advocacy at Century’s 
End, in RELATIONAL AUTONOMY, supra note 10, at 181. 
 64.  NEDELSKY, supra note 10, at 52 (using the image of the isolated Marlboro man 
as a symbol of the aspiration to independence and autonomy). 
 65.  Id. at 28.  
 66.  John Christman, Autonomy, Independence, and Poverty-Related Welfare 
Policies, 12 PUB. AFF. Q. 383 (1998). 
 67.  See FRIEDMAN, supra note 10, at 47-50.  Note that Dagan and Dorfman 
attribute the separation between autonomy and dependence to the libertarian conception 
of autonomy rather than to the liberal one. See Dagan & Dorfman, supra note 51, at 
1414-15. 
 68.  See NEDELSKY, supra note 10, at 161.  But see Dagan & Dorfman, supra note 
51, at 1414-17 (arguing that a profound account of liberal equality does not disregard 
differences between persons, and that persons should respect others as equals 
regardless of such differences).  
 69.  See, e.g., MARTHA MINOW‎, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE 51 (1990); Jennifer 
Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities, 1 YALE ‎J.L. & 
FEMINISM 7, 8 (1989). 
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physical and emotional characteristics are considered less autonomous, and 
are thus exposed to being treated paternalistically.
70
  It is also harder for 
those groups to identify with the prevailing conception of personal 
autonomy. 
Moreover, the abstract conception of the autonomous person directly 
influences the conceptualization of the autonomous process.  Here as well, 
the liberal conception emphasizes the intellectual, rational and reasonable 
aspects of the process, while ignoring its physical and emotional aspects.
71
  
The autonomous process, according to relational scholars, is not just 
intellectual and not influenced only by reasonable considerations.  Rather, 
it is also influenced by the person’s concrete physical characteristics (such 
as sex, color, body size, etc.), as well as constant and temporal physical 
conditions (such as disability, hormonal changes, fatigue, physical strength, 
sickness, health, etc.).
72
  It is also influenced by a person’s emotional state: 
happy, excited, sad, angry, confident or worried.  Any attempt to 
disconnect the body and the emotions and base the process of autonomous 




It should be noted that some of the abovementioned critiques were 
criticized for presenting a “caricature” of the liberal conception and 
disregarding the ways in which many liberal scholars relate to the influence 
of personal relations and social connections on personal autonomy.
74
  
Nonetheless, the critiques of the highly-individualized conception of 
autonomy are mostly justified.  Although liberal scholars have dealt with 
some relational aspects of autonomy, they have indeed failed to 
conceptualize the complex connection between persons’ autonomy and 
                                                          
 70.  See SARA RUDDICK, MATERNAL THINKING: TOWARD A POLITICS OF PEACE 194 
(1989); IRIS YOUNG, ON FEMALE BODY EXPERIENCE: “THROWING LIKE A GIRL” AND 
OTHER ESSAYS (2005); Natalie Stoljar, Autonomy and the Feminist Intuition, in 
RELATIONAL AUTONOMY, supra note 10, at 94, 106; Young, supra note 59, at 96-121 
(1990).  
 71.  CODE, supra note 63, at 110-72; NEDELSKY, supra note 10, at 50, 162; Oshana, 
supra note 60, at 83-86; Stoljar, supra note 70. 
 72.  Diana Tietjens Meyers, Decentralizing Autonomy: Five Faces of Selfhood, in 
AUTONOMY AND THE CHALLENGES TO LIBERALISM 27, 31 (John Christman & Joel 
Anderson eds., 2005). 
 73.  NEDELSKY, supra note 10, at 164-65 (citing ANTONIO DAMASIO, DESCARTES’ 
ERROR: EMOTION, REASON AND THE HUMAN BRAIN (2008)); see also Susan J. Brison, 
Outliving Oneself: Trauma, Memory and Personal Identity, in FEMINISTS RETHINK THE 
SELF, supra note 10, at 12 (arguing that a detachment from one’s body is a symptom of 
post-trauma, rather than a healthy decision-making procedure).  
 74.  See FRIEDMAN, supra note 10, at 87-88; Catriona Mackenzie & Natalie Stoljar, 
Introduction, in RELATIONAL AUTONOMY, supra note 10, at 3, 5.  
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their relationships.
75
  More specifically, most liberal scholars have not 
sufficiently addressed the concrete, dynamic ways in which personal 
autonomy evolves, develops and changes through the interactions with 
others and within the networks of personal and social connections and 
relationships.  Even Dagan and Dorfman’s account of relational justice, 
while indeed tying between relationships and personal autonomy in a more 
complex manner than most liberal scholars, does not address the ways in 
which autonomous processes are conducted through personal relationships 
and interactions.  Consequently, and although casting a personal duty to 
accommodate others’ choices and respect others’ autonomy, Dagan and 
Dorfman as well disregard the active role of others in one’s autonomous 
processes and the duties derived from this role.  This limits the ability to 
articulate a comprehensive legal right to personal autonomy based on its 
liberal conception. 
B. The Failure to Address Socialization and Its Consequences 
Critics of the liberal conception of autonomy have also highlighted 
liberal scholarship’s inadequate attention to the problem of socialization.  
Philosopher Diana Meyers defines socialization as the delicate social 
processes that are hard to notice and pinpoint but nonetheless tremendously 
influence a person’s belonging to her community.
76
  These processes are 
embedded in wide social systems and in many social arenas (such as the 
family, the workplace, the community, the media, popular culture, and so 
on), and formulate one’s preferences, values, beliefs, aspirations, etc.  
Socialization is crucial for one’s self-development and autonomy, as it 
enables her to situate herself within a specific community and society and 
enjoy a feeling of belonging and confidence, while acquiring an education 
and absorbing social values.
77
  One cannot realistically avoid socialization, 




However, socialization also has some dark sides.  Under its influence, it 
is hard to distinguish between one’s authentic choices and choices that stem 
from coerced adaptation to social norms.  Moreover, under strong 
socialization persons might choose to live a life that cannot be regarded as 
autonomous.
79
  Socialization might lead a woman, for example, to conform 
                                                          
 75.  See FRIEDMAN, supra note 10, at 95.   
 76.  MEYERS, supra note 10, at 26. 
 77.  Id. at 189-202; Paul Benson, Oppressive Socialization, 17 SOC. THEORY & 
PRACTICE 385 (1991). 
 78.  MEYERS, supra note 10, at 189-202. 
 79.  See Benson, supra note 77; Oshana, supra note 60; Stoljar, supra note 70. 
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to coercive social norms of feminine beauty,
80
 to adopt a subservient stance 
in her social role as a woman,
81
 and so on.  These aspects of socialization 
have served as the basis for critiques on the content neutrality of the 
procedural approach to personal autonomy, i.e., its focus on the process 
rather than on the process’s outcome.
82
  Due to content neutrality, 
according to the critiques, non-autonomous outcomes might be wrongfully 
conceived as autonomous, merely because they are the product of a 
reflective process.  It should be noted, however, that what is considered a 
non-autonomous choice as well as what is considered coercive socialization 
are difficult and complex questions.  Not surprisingly, even those who 
criticize the content neutrality of the procedural approach rarely offer a 
conclusive distinction between autonomous and non-autonomous choices 
or between benign and coercive socialization.
83
 
Christman offers a defense against the substantive critique of the 
procedural account of personal autonomy.
84
  First, he criticizes the 
substantive approach, arguing that it is paternalistic: it coerces specific 
values on a person rather than respect her own values and choices.
85
  
Therefore, according to Christman, the substantive approach might infringe 
personal autonomy.  Second, he argues, if as a part of one’s critical 
reflection one critically examines the socialization and specifically the 
social norms that led her to formulate specific options and make a specific 
choice, she acts autonomously.
86
  A critical examination of the impact of 
socialization includes, inter alia, the ability to imagine a different choice 
under different circumstances.
87
  When one does so, a choice that conforms 
                                                          
 80.  Benson, supra note 77.  
 81.  Stoljar, supra note 70. 
 82.  The content-neutrality critique is not unique to feminist or relational 
scholarship, but is also voiced by liberal scholars who take a substantive approach to 
autonomy and object to the content-neutral approaches. See, e.g., Sigurdur Kristinsson, 
The Limits of Neutrality: Toward a Weakly Substantive Account of Autonomy, 30 CAN. 
J. PHIL. 257 (2000); Robert Young, Autonomy and Socialization, 89 MIND 356 (1989); 
Robert Young, The Value of Autonomy, 32 PHIL. Q. 35 (1982). However, it bears 
emphasis that these liberal scholars, like their procedural counterparts, also conceive 
personal autonomy as internal and individualistic.  
 83.  See Paul Benson, Free Agency and Self-Worth, 91 J. PHIL. 650 (1994); Stoljar, 
supra note 70. 
 84.  Christman, as we have seen above and shall see in further parts of this Article, 
is considered a relational scholar. Nonetheless, some parts of his account of personal 
autonomy, specifically his approach to socialization, are closer to the liberal conception 
of autonomy. 
 85.  Christman, supra note 10, at 158. 
 86.  Id. at 154. 
 87.  Id. at 155; John Christman, Autonomy and Personal History, 21 J. PHIL. 1, 10 
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to social norms constitutes an autonomous endorsement of those norms.  
Similarly, one can endorse subservient relations, if the endorsement is the 




The endorsement defense invites further critiques.  The assumption that 
each person can simply examine her socialization and its consequences is 
based on the internal isolated image of the autonomous process, discussed 
in the previous Section.  It overlooks the ways in which the autonomous 
process is embedded in the same connections, relationships and social 
norms that are supposed to be critically reflected upon.  In other words, the 
process itself and the very ability to reflect are tremendously influenced by 
socialization.  Moreover, the stronger and more coercive the socialization, 
the harder it is to notice it and its consequences; and even if it can be 
noticed and critically examined, it is extremely hard to resist it.  Thinking 
of non-resistance to socialization as its autonomous endorsement might 
strengthen it and its coercive consequences instead of weakening it and 
enabling one to resist it.
89
 
Such an assumption of alleged endorsement of coercive socialization has 
also been criticized for leading to the abuse of the concept of free choice in 
order to justify women’s social subservience and discrimination.  For 
instance, the decision of women to be stay-at-home moms and give up their 
own careers,
90
 to apply to less competitive (and less rewarding) jobs,
91
 or to 
stay with their abusive spouses
92
 — all can be considered autonomous 
choices under the procedural content-neutral account.  Therefore, all can be 
considered as an endorsement of subservient social norms.  Of course, at 
least some of those choices might be genuinely and authentically 
autonomous, but under strong socialization it is hard to tell to what extent 




Another critique of Christman’s argument that socialization can be 
reflected upon addresses the impact of a person’s socioeconomic status on 
her ability to conduct any such reflection.  To critically reflect on social 
                                                          
(1991); John Christman, Liberalism and Individual Positive Freedom, 101 ETHICS 343, 
346-47 (1991). 
 88.  Christman, supra note 10, at 154.  
 89.  Andrea C. Westlund, Rethinking Relational Autonomy, 24 HYPATIA 26 (2009). 
 90.  See JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER 37-39 (2000). 
 91.  See Vicky Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial 
Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack 
of Interest Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1749 (1990). 
 92.  See FRIEDMAN, supra note 10, at 144. 
 93.  Benson, supra note 77. 
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norms, one must be aware of them, recognize them and realize their 
consequences.  Such awareness might be a privilege of the stronger, more 
educated social groups.
94
  The ability of underprivileged social groups to 
recognize socialization and its consequences and include them within the 
critical reflective process might be limited (or conceived as limited).  A 
similar limitation may result from the lack of adequate material resources.
95
  
When a person invests her cognitive and emotional efforts in survival and 
obtaining the basic needs for her and her family, she is less able to dedicate 
them to conducting reflective processes.
96
  The liberal conception of 
personal autonomy rarely properly addresses these significant aspects of 
socialization and a shortage of material resources.
97
 
Now, there is a catch: on the one hand, if we assume that any and every 
person can be aware of socialization, then subservient choices made by 
members of underprivileged groups might be considered an endorsement of 
coercive socialization.  This consideration might strengthen those groups’ 
social marginalization.  On the other hand, if we acknowledge their 
difficulty in recognizing socialization and critically reflecting upon it, those 
groups might be considered non-autonomous, thus justifying a paternalistic 
approach towards them.  Either way, the liberal procedural content-neutral 
account of autonomy infringes the ability of members of such groups to 
develop their personal autonomy.  Add to that the limited role of the state 
under the liberal, individualistic conceptualization of the right to personal 
autonomy, and the result is that underprivileged groups are left to deal with 
the harmful impacts and consequences of socialization on their own. 
The critiques that have been discussed thus far, namely the dominance of 
individualism and the failure to address the consequences of socialization 
                                                          
 94.  FRIEDMAN, supra note 10, at 45-47; Benson, supra note 83, at 654-55. It bears 
mention that Friedman takes a procedural approach to autonomy, but adapts it to the 
relational conception of autonomy, inter alia by directly addressing the challenges of 
socialization. See Marilyn Friedman, Relational Autonomy and Independence, in 
AUTONOMY, OPPRESSION, AND GENDER, supra note 10, at 42. 
 95.  See FRIEDMAN, supra note 10, at 18; Carolyn McLeod & Susan Sherwin, 
Relational Autonomy, Self-Trust, and Health Care for Patients Who Are Oppressed, in 
RELATIONAL AUTONOMY, supra note 10, at 259, 261; see also Menachem Mautner, A 
Liberalism of Flourishing (Nov. 17, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
author) (referring to the centrality of social and material resources in the philosophical 
current usually referred to as “liberalism of flourishing” — as opposed to liberalism of 
autonomy). 
 96.  See Eldar Shafir, Poverty and Civil Rights: A Behavioral Economics 
Perspective, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 205, 206, 213-15 (2014).  
 97.  Raz only briefly and anecdotally mentions the infringement to autonomy 
caused when a person needs to focus on her basic survival. See RAZ, supra note 2, at 
155; see also A.L.H. Hart, Between Utility and Rights, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 828, 836 
(1979). 
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and a shortage of material resources, reveal some of the limitations of the 
liberal conception of autonomy as the basis for the right to autonomy.  As 
mentioned above, a partial and inaccurate conceptualization of personal 
autonomy is not merely a theoretical problem, but rather determines the 
formulation of legal rights, specifically the right to personal autonomy.  
Therefore, an alternative, more adequate theoretical ground is required for 
developing the right to personal autonomy.  Such is provided by the 
relational conception of personal autonomy, which emerged from the 
feminist critiques and is further discussed in the next Part. 
IV. THE RELATIONAL CONCEPTION OF PERSONAL AUTONOMY 
A. Finding One’s Own Law 
Most feminist scholars who have criticized the liberal conception of 
personal autonomy have not argued that autonomy should be neglected.
98
  
On the contrary, they have advocated for the intrinsic value of personal 
autonomy and shown that women need personal autonomy in order to 
define their own lives — lives that are as free as possible from coercion.
99
  
The concept of autonomy is crucial for identifying the causes of women’s 
subjection,
100
 as well as combating them.
101
  Consequently, out of the 
feminist critiques of the liberal conception of personal autonomy, a new 
current emerged during the 1980s: relational autonomy.  Relational 
autonomy has included personal autonomy within the feminist movement, 
while adapting it to feminist principles.
102
  Contrary to the liberal, 
individualistic conception of autonomy, the relational conception highlights 
the relational nature of persons, and the development of their identity and 
autonomy through social connections and relationships with others.  Being 
a part of relationships and social networks makes all persons 
interdependent; however, interdependence does not infringe their 
autonomy, but is rather simply an inherent part of their personhood.
103
 
                                                          
 98.  Mackenzie & Stoljar, supra note 74, at 3, 5. But see SARA HOAGLAND, 
LESBIAN ETHICS: TOWARD NEW VALUE 144-47 (1988) (suggesting that the concept of 
autonomy be replaced with the concept of “autokoenony,” i.e., the community-self). 
 99.  See NEDELSKY, supra note 10, at 43-44. 
 100.  Mackenzie & Stoljar, supra note 74, at 3-4. 
 101.  Marilyn Friedman, Autonomy, Social Disruption and Women, in RELATIONAL 
AUTONOMY, supra note 10, at 35, 47. 
 102.  Id. at 36-37. At about the same time other liberal conceptions, such as justice, 
privacy and equality, were criticized by feminist scholars, who suggested their new, 
feminist conceptualization. See, e.g., ANITA ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS (1988) (privacy); 
SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY (1989) (justice); Christine A. 
Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1279 (1987) (equality). 
 103.  CODE, supra note 63, at 71-105; NEDELSKY, supra note 10, at 28; Baier, supra 
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According to the relational scholarship, autonomy emerges, develops and 
transforms through those relationships and connections, and through a 
person’s interactions with other persons, such as family, friends, 
community members, employers, colleagues and employees, the state, 
public and private institutions, and so on.
104
   
Nedelsky clarifies the significance of relationships by challenging the 
basic liberal definition of autonomy as determining one’s own law.  
According to Nedelsky, one cannot determine her own law, but rather must 
search and find it.
105
  The law is not formed within the person and she does 
not choose it: there is no “menu” of laws.  Rather, the self-law is 
formulated through a person’s constant understanding of the social 
connections, powers and structures, as well as the relationships in which 
she is embedded, combined with her constant interaction with other persons 
and institutions.
106
  Since relationships and social structures and 
connections are dynamic and change over time, so does one’s own law.  
Finding it, according to Nedelsky, is a lifelong dynamic project.
107
  The 
relational account of autonomy, then, does not assume the mere existence 
of personal autonomy or a “self-law,” but rather constantly asks how both 




Several relational scholars have endorsed the procedural account of 
personal autonomy, while adapting it to the relational conception of 
autonomy.  They have included variety of options, the autonomous 
reflective process and the competency to act autonomously among the 
conditions needed for autonomy, but have also emphasized the role of 
relationships in promoting (or withholding) those conditions.
109
  The 
                                                          
note 60, at 180 (“A person, perhaps, is best seen as one who was long enough 
dependent upon other persons to acquire the essential arts of personhood. Persons 
essentially are second persons, who grow up with other persons.”). 
 104.  NEDELSKY, supra note 10, at 30-31. 
 105.  Id. at 123-24. 
 106.  Id. at 124. It bears emphasis that this is not a deterministic account, according 
to which a person has absolutely no control over her life and choices. On the contrary, 
an autonomous person, according to Nedelsky, is a person who can find her own way 
in light of her inability to control substantial parts of her life. See id. at 277-306. For 
another alternative conception of the autonomous person — as the storyteller of her 
own life (rather than the author of her own life), see HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN 
CONDITION 184-86 (1958). Such a conception also takes into account the other persons 
in one’s life, who serve as an audience and as the relational networks within which a 
person’s autonomy is developed. 
 107.  NEDELSKY, supra note 10, at 50, 124. 
 108.  Id. at 278-79. 
 109.  See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 10, at 15, 65, 103-04; MEYERS, supra note 10. 
20
American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 25, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 1
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol25/iss2/1
  
2017] RIGHT TO PERSONAL AUTONOMY 131 
reflective process — whether anecdotal or ongoing
110
 — takes place 
through dialogues, deliberations and interactions with others.  Similarly, 
the competency to act autonomously is learned from others and is 
developed through the relationships with them.  In the same manner, the 
variety of options is formulated and transformed within one’s network of 
relationships.  The influence is dyadic: one’s relationships with others 
affect her personal autonomy, and at the same time one’s personal 
autonomy affects her relationships with others.  In other words, contrary to 
the rather linear, analytic and internal perception of the autonomous 
process in liberal scholarship, the relational scholarship perceives it as a 
dynamic, fluid and external process.  This dynamic process does not mean 
that one’s decisions and choices are not her own.  Rather, the emphasis is 
on the contention that autonomy does not develop in solitary — and the 
same is true with regard to the processes through which one makes her 
decisions. 
It is important to emphasize that relational scholars are extremely careful 
not to romanticize connections and relationships.  In this regard, they 
distinguish themselves from communitarian critics of the liberal conception 
of autonomy, who tend to focus mainly on the positive attributes of 
communities and their contribution to the development of the self.
111
  
Relational scholars also address the ways in which relationships can harm 
autonomy, and vice versa.  A person, for instance, may be embedded 
within a network of relationships that infringe her personal autonomy. For 
this reason, the relational scholarship distinguishes between relationships 
that foster autonomy and those that undermine it.
112
  At the same time, a 
person’s self-conception as autonomous may lead her to prefer to leave 
certain relationships including, but not limited to, destructive ones.  In 
addition, the enhancement of one’s autonomy might be conceived as 
threatening by other members of her community (or other social group) and 
thus lead to her exclusion.
113
  In any case, the possible tensions between 
relationships and personal autonomy do not undermine the relational 
account, but merely complicate it.
114
  Those tensions are conceived as 
                                                          
 110.  See MEYERS, supra note 10, at 40-48 (distinguishing between episodic 
autonomy and programmatic autonomy).  
 111.  See FRIEDMAN, supra note 10, at 86; NEDELSKY, supra note 10, at 32. 
 112.  See infra Section III.B. 
 113.  FRIEDMAN, supra note 10, at 106. 
 114.  EVELYN FOX KELLER, REFLECTIONS ON GENDER AND SCIENCE 112-13 (1985); 
NEDELSKY, supra note 10, at 52 (demonstrating the tensions between collective and 
personal autonomy, and pointing to the contribution of the relational theory to the 
conceptualization of those tensions: “It is not that a better framework makes the 
puzzles, both theoretical and practical, simply disappear. But they are reconstituted in a 
way that makes them productive rather than illogical or simply frustrating.”). 
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inherent to the relational conception of personal autonomy and to its 
dynamic evolvement and development.
115
 
B. Constructive Relationships as a Necessary Condition for Personal 
Autonomy 
The centrality of relationships in one’s life has led relational scholars to 
add another, crucial condition for the development of personal autonomy: 
constructive relationships.
116
  Constructive relationships are relationships 
that enable the development of original thinking, critical competency and 
creativity.  The interaction of a person with others within constructive 
relationships and a supportive environment enables her to develop her 
autonomy by observing others, leaning on them, learning from them, 
experiencing autonomy with them and practicing it with their help.
117
  
Constructive relationships enhance one’s confidence in herself and in 
others, which encourages her to acknowledge her self-worth, formulate her 
goals and execute them.
118
  Constructive relationships, in other words, are 
crucial for one’s self-determination.  When a child grows up around adults 
who are self-confident, she is more likely to become self-confident as well, 
especially if her confidence is actively fostered by the adults around her.
119
  
Constructive relationships nurture one’s selfhood and self-worth within the 
networks of relationships in which she is embedded; and in turn, one’s 
selfhood and self-worth enhance her constructive relationships with others.  
                                                          
 115.  Friedman, supra note 94, at 60. 
 116.  See NEDELSKY, supra note 10, at 38-41, 46-49. I must emphasize that 
Nedelsky explicitly abstains from referring to relationships as a “condition.” Id. at 46. 
According to Nedelsky, using the language of conditions might lead to a static and 
binary conception of personal autonomy. However, her conceptualization of 
relationships that foster autonomy (constructive relationships) is powerful and can 
substantially contribute to the development of a relational-procedural account of 
personal autonomy. This account, as we shall see in the next Part, contributes to the 
relational conceptualization of the legal right to personal autonomy. Therefore, when 
discussing constructive relationships as a crucial condition for personal autonomy, I 
lean on Nedelsky’s discussion on constructive relationships, while being extremely 
careful not to take her conceptualization out of its context. Specifically, in my reference 
to relationships as a condition, I maintain their dynamic and evolving nature, which is 
central to Nedelsky’s account. 
 117.  FRIEDMAN, supra note 10, at 15, 65; NEDELSKY, supra note 10, at 55. 
 118.  Benson, supra 83. 
 119.  See, e.g., Inge Seiffge-Krenke & Vilmante Pakalniskiene, Who Shapes Whom 
in the Family: Reciprocal Links Between Autonomy Support in the Family and Parents’ 
and Adolescents’ Coping Behaviors, 40 J. YOUTH & CHILD. 983 (2011); Laura Wray-
Lake, Ann C. Crouter & Susan M. McHale, Developmental Patterns in Decision-
Making Autonomy Across Middle Childhood and Adolescence: European American 
Parents’ Perspectives, 81 CHILD DEV. 636 (2010). 
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Through constructive interactions, one can discover new areas of interest, 
her preferences change, and her abilities to be innovative and creative are 
enhanced.  All of these, in turn, enhance the constructive nature of existing 
relationships and enable her to develop new ones.  Hence, the connection 
between constructive relationships and personal autonomy is of a 
reinforcing nature: constructive relationships serve as a crucial basic 
condition for the development of personal autonomy, and personal 
autonomy contributes to the enhancement and development of constructive 
relationships.  This reinforcing nature is a prominent feature of the 
relational account of personal autonomy. 
The influence of constructive relationships on personal autonomy is also 
apparent with regard to the autonomous critical reflective process.  The 
reflective process improves if conducted through constructive dialogues 
and interactions with others.
120
  Deliberations with one’s spouse, parents, 
other family members, colleagues and friends enable her to identify more 
clearly her desires, considerations and preferences.  In some cases, the 
mere need to explain a certain preference or choice to others helps a person 
articulate it more precisely.  The explanation of choices thus promotes a 
more accurate and substantial reflective process than when it is conducted 
alone.  Moreover, the dialogue with others gives them a chance to suggest 
new considerations, options and perspectives, which may be crucial for the 
reflective process, whether regarding a concrete urgent decision or a long-
term life-plan.  Such an influence is also reinforcing by nature: the 
deliberative constructive process and the personal autonomy that is 
nurtured within it in turn enhance the relationships themselves. 
Conversely, destructive relationships might infringe autonomy.  Such 
relationships are characterized by coercion, exploitation, oppression, 
violence and self-deprecation.  Therefore, according to Nedelsky, although 
relationships are considered central to the relational account of autonomy, 
its main purpose is not to preserve existing relationships at any cost, but 
rather to evaluate whether certain relationships are constructive or 
destructive.
121
   Destructive relationships limit one’s ability to formulate an 
adequate variety of options, reduce the likelihood of a constructive 
deliberative reflective process, and diminish one’s confidence and self-
worth.  Moreover, destructive relationships restrict a person’s ability to 
develop alternative, constructive ones.  For instance, it is rather difficult for 
battered wives to develop social relationships outside their homes, and thus 
they suffer not only from the violence itself, but also from isolation.
122
  
                                                          
 120.  See Andrea C. Westlund, Autonomy and Self-Care, in AUTONOMY, 
OPPRESSION, AND GENDER, supra 10, at 181. 
 121.  NEDELSKY, supra note 10, at 32, 122-23.  
 122.  Jan Bostock, Maureen Plumpton & Rebekah Pratt, Domestic Violence Against 
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This isolation prevents them from strengthening their personal autonomy 
through constructive relationships with others, making it even harder for 
them to leave the destructive, violent relationship.  Clearly, the reinforcing 
nature of the connection between relationships and personal autonomy can 
be negative as well as positive. 
Destructive relationships are not only interpersonal, but may exist in 
other, broader social contexts, such as cultural or religious conservative 
communities and societies.  The question whether the relationships within a 
conservative community infringe or enhance one’s autonomy is constantly 
debated in academia as well as in political discourses.  On the one hand, 
such communities tend to provide their members with a wide and strong 
safety net, which fosters their confidence in themselves and in others, 
enables them to develop constructive relationships, and promotes their 
personal autonomy.
123
  Putting aside the extreme cases of cults, most 
conservative communities do not tend to forcefully oppress their members 
and negate their selfhood and autonomy.  On the other hand, in many cases 
— not just the extreme — belonging to a conservative community might 
limit a person’s variety of options and her chances of practicing 
autonomy.
124
  Moreover, the relationships within conservative communities 
might be oppressive and subservient in part, i.e., they might be destructive 
and infringe the ability of the community members to develop their 
personal autonomy. 
Nonetheless, relational scholars are careful not to assume that persons 
who are embedded within destructive relationships are not autonomous at 
all.  Such persons’ autonomy is most likely diminished, but not annulled, 
since personal autonomy is not binary, but rather a matter of degree.
125
  
Accordingly, every person can autonomously choose to leave destructive 
relationships or a destructive community.  However, relational scholars are 
also aware of the difficulties in identifying the destructive nature of such 
relationships, specifically the difficulty of leaving them.  First, as discussed 
above, the limited autonomy within such relationships restricts the ability 
to critically evaluate them.
126
  Such an evaluation takes place within the 
community itself, in light of its values and norms, and through the 
                                                          
Women: Understanding Social Processes and Women’s Experiences, 19 J. COMMUNITY 
APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 95, 99 (2009). 
 123.  JOEL F. HANDLER, THE CONDITIONS OF DISCRETION: AUTONOMY, COMMUNITY, 
BUREAUCRACY 265 (1986); MEYERS, supra note 10, at 26 (referring to the bright sides 
of socialization); see also NEDELSKY, supra note 10, at 125 (referring to a legitimate 
framework of collective force). 
 124.  Christman, supra note 10, at 154. 
 125.  FRIEDMAN, supra note 10, at 104. 
 126.  See supra notes 88-97 and accompanying text; see also Oshana, supra note 60. 
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interaction with its members.  Therefore, if the communal relationships are 
oppressive and coercive, such an evaluation is substantially limited.  Here, 
again, we see the negative impact of the reinforcing nature of relational 
autonomy.  Moreover, the relational theory explicitly addresses the costs of 
leaving a community — even a coercive one.  Besides the material 
resources that are needed to start a new life outside the community, in 
many cases leaving it also means leaving behind family and friends. From a 
relational perspective, these costs are extremely high.
127
 
To conclude, the relational scholarship attributes great significance to the 
existence of constructive relationships in one’s life, and addresses the 
impacts of destructive relationships.  It conceives personal autonomy and 
the autonomous process as a major way to evaluate relationships and 
forsake destructive ones, though it acknowledges the limited ability to 
conduct such an evaluation and leave such relationships.  The ongoing and 
reinforcing connection between relationships and personal autonomy — 
whether positive or negative by nature — stands at the heart of the 
relational account of personal autonomy. 
C. The Synergy Between Individuality and Relationships 
Alongside the centrality of relationships, most relational scholars have 
not neglected the individualistic character of the autonomous person and 
personal autonomy.
128
  This focus does not entail a return to the liberal 
internal abstract conception of personal autonomy.  Rather, the relational 
authors point to the inherent connection between one’s individuality and 
her relationships with others, as well as to their interdependence and 
mutual constructiveness.  Individuality evolves and develops within one’s 
relationships and, at the same time, (constructive) relationships can be 
developed and fostered only between distinct individuals.  Similarly, as 
Nedelsky points out, a person’s selfhood and autonomy evolve and are 
transformed through her relations with her community, and the community 
is transformed and changes through the choices of the individuals who 
constitute it.
129
  In other words, one’s individuality and relationships are 
synergic and reinforcing; and this synergy is what enables the development 
                                                          
 127.  In the next Part, we shall see how the relational perspective is translated to a 
duty of the state to promote the personal autonomy of persons trapped in oppressive 
relationships. See infra Section IV.C.  
 128.  See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 10, at 116-17; NEDELSKY, supra note 10, at 
21, 52; Christman, supra note 10; Catriona Mackenzie, Three Dimensions of 
Autonomy: A Relational Analysis, in AUTONOMY, OPPRESSION, AND GENDER, supra 10, 
at 15; see also Elizabeth Anderson, Towards a Non-Ideal, Relational Methodology for 
Political Philosophy, 24 HYPATIA 132 (2009). 
 129.  NEDELSKY, supra note 10, at 21. 
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of one’s personal autonomy. 
Note that Nedelsky declares that she prioritizes relationships over 
individuality, for two reasons: first, she contends that relationship networks 
constitute a major part of all individuals, and hence theorizing relationships 
is sufficient for the conceptualization of personal autonomy and the 
individual autonomous person.
130
  Second, she argues that the 
individualistic character of personal autonomy still prevails in the 
scholarship on autonomy, and therefore a preference for its relational 
aspects is required.
131
  Nonetheless, she attributes major significance to a 
person’s individuality and distinctiveness from others, and not just to 
relationships.
132
  Nedelsky clarifies that conceptualizing autonomy in 
relational terms does not entail the subjugation of a person to a collective, 
such as the family, the community, or the nation.
133
  Personal autonomy 
evolves within those relationships, but a person is not merged into them. 
Friedman points out another aspect of the synergic connection between 
autonomy and relationships through her discussion on autonomy within 
romantic love.  She begins by denying the notion that romantic love 
inherently merges both partners into a single entity and negates their 
individuality.
134
  Such a conception of romantic relationships leans on the 
contradiction between individuality and relationships, and it prevails in 
Western cultures, albeit mostly metaphorically.
135
  Instead, Friedman 
suggests that we should perceive romantic love as creating a third entity: 
beside the distinct partners, there is also a romantic merger.
136
  Both 
partners constitute the third entity, but, at the same time, it is separate from 
them.  All three entities (both individual lovers and the romantic merger) 
interact with each other, change each other, and are transformed in light of 
each other.  Within this dynamic interaction, the personal autonomy of each 
partner develops in a way that ties both partners together, yet maintains 
their individuality and distinctiveness.
137
 
                                                          
 130.  Id. at 30. 
 131.  Id.  
 132.  Id. at 35-36 (“I embrace the notion of the unique, infinite value of each 
individual, and the value of interiority, and the value of the ability of individuals to 
shape their own lives.”). 
 133.  Id. at 86. 
 134.  FRIEDMAN, supra note 10, at 116-17. 
 135.  Id.  
 136.  Id. at 117-20. 
 137.  Needless to say, Friedman does not attribute only positive facets to romantic 
relationships, but also addresses their inherent tensions and the ways in which they 
might infringe autonomy and individuality. See id. at 120, 127-29. Like other relational 
scholars, Friedman perceives such tensions as an inherent part of the relational 
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D. The Multidimensional Self 
Having discussed the importance of constructive relationships and of 
individuality, I now turn to discuss another aspect of the relational 
conception of personal autonomy: the significance it attributes to the body 
and to emotions.  This significance is analyzed here through the concept of 
the multidimensional self, as developed by Nedelsky.  Contrary to the 
liberal abstract and monolithic conception of the person, Nedelsky portrays 
the person as multidimensional.
138
  Along with her intellect and reason, a 
person has myriad dimensions that characterize her, including her sex, 
gender, color, ethnicity, body size, nature, emotions, religion, etc.
139
  All of 
them constitute inherent parts of the person’s selfhood, make her unique 
and distinct from others; and at the same time, they shape and construct her 
relationships with others.  The complexity of a person, according to 
Nedelsky, is what constitutes her creative interactions with others, and 
personal autonomy is a part of this creative interaction.
140
  Any account that 
ignores the myriad dimensions of a person conceptualizes personhood and 
autonomy in a partial, superficial and inaccurate manner. 
Other relational scholars as well place special emphasis on the physical 
and emotional dimensions of the self.  Meyers, for example, criticizes the 
exclusion from the liberal scholarship of a person’s self-perception as being 
embodied.  She shows that the body is a crucial part of one’s identity and 
selfhood, and thus has a tremendous impact on the development of one’s 
autonomy.
141
  The body can limit the ability to act autonomously (e.g., 
when sick, weak or disabled), but it can also enhance one’s autonomy.  
Meyers demonstrates the ability of the body to enhance one’s autonomy 
quite interestingly: when a person is in danger or going through an 
emergency crisis, the body reacts by releasing the hormone adrenaline.  
This adrenal reaction is what enables a person to gather her strength and 
overcome the crisis in a way that would not necessarily be possible with the 
mere power of mind and intellect.
142
  This practical example clarifies the 
                                                          
conceptualization of personal autonomy. 
 138.  See NEDELSKY, supra note 10, at 158-73. 
 139.  Id.; see also Christman, supra note 10, at 147. 
 140.  NEDELSKY, supra note 10, at 158. 
 141.  Meyers, supra note 72, at 31. 
 142.  Id. at 33-34. Meyers presents this example by telling a personal story about her 
own physical experience, through which she learned about herself and personal 
autonomy. While hiking alone, Meyers fell and broke her wrists; nevertheless, she 
managed to reach a safe place and receive medical treatment. She describes the way her 
body reacted to the emergency and enabled her to cope with it. The way Meyers uses 
this personal physical experience as a way of learning and developing a theoretical 
notion emphasizes even more the significant role she attributes to the body as a source 
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importance of one’s body for her competency to act autonomously.  It also 
highlights the strong interdependence between one’s body and mind: the 
body cannot function without the mind, and the mind cannot function 
without the body.
143
  Together, they enable a person to act autonomously 
and develop her personal autonomy. 
A person’s emotions constitute another important dimension of the 
multidimensional self.  Contrary to the liberal conception of feelings and 
emotions as contradicting reason and rationality — and possibly distorting 
one’s realistic perception and observation — philosopher Christin Tappolet 
has analyzed their crucial evaluative role.
144
  Emotions — and not only 
reasonable thinking — enable a person to be aware of important 
considerations and aspects when going through autonomous processes.
145
  
Moreover, Tappolet emphasizes that feelings and emotions are not only 
internal, but rather constitute a major part of one’s relationships with 
others.  Love, anger, disappointment, sadness, happiness, etc. — all take 
part in forming one’s personal relations, constitute them and transform 
them.
146
  Therefore, all have a direct impact on the development of one’s 
personal autonomy.  Tappolet admits that there are situations in which 
feelings and emotions do distort the conception of reality and thus might 
infringe one’s ability to act autonomously, but she does not find such 
occurrences to justify the complete disregard and exclusion of emotions 
from the conceptualization of personal autonomy.  Her contention is even 
more powerful if we keep in mind that the intellect as well can lead to a 
distorted conception of reality, given possible cognitive biases.
147
  Both 
intellect and emotions, therefore, play a crucial part in evaluating reality, 
and both are required to improve autonomous processes.  Both intellect and 
emotions, according to the relational account of personal autonomy, 
constitute a part of a person’s reason and rationality, and both are 
considered major sources of knowledge.
148
 
                                                          
of both personal autonomy and knowledge. 
 143.  Id. at 49. 
 144.  Christine Tappolet, Emotions, Reasons, and Autonomy, in AUTONOMY, 
OPPRESSION, AND GENDER, supra note 10, at 163, 172. 
 145.  Id. at 177, 178. 
 146.  Id. at 181. 
 147.  See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: 
Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974). 
 148.  See NEDELSKY, supra note 10, at 164-66; Meyers, supra note 72; Tappolet, 
supra note 144. 
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V. A PRELIMINARY DEFINITION OF THE RIGHT TO PERSONAL AUTONOMY: 
THE STATE’S RESPONSIBILITY FOR CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIPS 
The previous Part stressed the synergic integrations between the mind 
and the body, between emotions and intellect, and between individuality 
and relationships, which form the relational conception of personal 
autonomy.  This synergy overcomes many of the flaws of the liberal 
conception of autonomy, which were discussed in Part II above, and can 
therefore serve as a more adequate basis for articulating the legal right to 
personal autonomy.  It provides a complex, rich conceptualization of 
personhood and autonomy and enables a more precise articulation of the 
right to personal autonomy and of the state’s duty to fulfill it.  Moreover, 
acknowledging the role of other people and institutions in the development 
of one’s autonomy — the state being one of those “others” — makes it 
simpler to advance the state’s responsibility for the personal autonomy of 
its citizens.  Lastly, the relational approach takes socialization and its 
consequences seriously and does not assume that each person can 
overcome them on her own; this facilitates a discussion on the 
responsibility of the state to address them, at least partially.  In other words, 
although the scholars who developed the relational conception of autonomy 
have not conceptualized personal autonomy as a legal right, their 
conceptualizations nonetheless can serve as a sound basis for the right to 
personal autonomy. 
Certainly, the relational conception has its own flaws, some of which 
have been discussed above.  One such flaw, which should be considered 
seriously when articulating the right to personal autonomy based on 
relational grounds, is the relational account’s tendency toward over-
particularization.
149
  This over-particularization, as Christman argues, 
might make it rather difficult to use the relational account of personal 
autonomy for further developing a normative model of autonomy.
150
  The 
myriad dimensions of the self, the dynamic nature of relationships, the 
focus on the differences between people rather than their similarities — all 
pose challenges to the goal of articulating personal autonomy as a broad 
legal right.  Therefore, the right to personal autonomy must be flexible 
enough to promote the personal autonomy of all members of a society, 
despite the apparent differences between them.
151
 
In this Part, I suggest some preliminary foundations for such an 
articulation of the right to personal autonomy.  Section A addresses the 
                                                          
 149.  See Christman, supra note 10, at 145. 
 150.  Id. 
 151.  On promoting equality in light of the differentiation between multidimensional 
individuals, see NEDELSKY, supra note 10, at 186-89. 
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state’s duty to promote constructive relationships between state institutions 
and the recipients of their services.  Section B turns to examine the state’s 
responsibility for constructive relations between people and private (or 
semi-private) institutions.  Section C focuses on the need to prevent 
destructive relationships.  Section D turns to the responsibility of the state 
to address the consequences of coercive socialization.  Lastly, in Section E, 
I address a possible consequence of the relational framework I suggest: the 
growing intervention of the state in people’s lives. 
A. Relationships Provided by the State 
A substantial part of the legal right to personal autonomy, when 
conceptualized in relational terms, is the state’s responsibility for ensuring 
the existence of constructive relationships in its citizens’ lives.  It bears 
emphasis that in most cases, the state is not responsible for providing its 
citizens with relationships per se; such a responsibility is quite rare.  
Rather, as we shall see in the following sections, the state’s responsibility is 
usually to ensure that existing relationships are constructive enough, 
enhance the constructiveness of such relationships, fix destructive ones (if 
possible), and help persons leave undesired destructive relationships.  
Nonetheless, some relationships are indeed provided by the state itself: 
such are, for example, the relationships within public educational 
institutions, and between welfare institutions and the recipients of their 
services. 
Under a relational conceptualization of the state’s duty to promote 
personal autonomy, it is not enough to supervise the adequacy of schools’ 
pedagogic contents, and it is not enough to provide welfare recipients with 
material necessities.  These are, of course, very important for the ability to 
lead an autonomous life and develop one’s autonomy, but they are not 
sufficient.  The relational approach also insists on ensuring that the 
relationships within those institutions are constructive.  The relationships 
between children and teachers should foster and nurture children’s personal 
autonomy.  Similarly, although the relationships between welfare 
institutions and the recipients of their services are hierarchal by nature and 
based on dependency, it does not mean they should necessarily be 
paternalistic, as they are usually perceived (and tend to be).
152
  Instead, 
according to the relational account of personal autonomy, such 
relationships can and should foster autonomy not only despite the inherent 
dependency they constitute, but also through this dependency. 
Christman demonstrates the connection between dependency and 
                                                          
 152.  NEDELSKY, supra note 10, at 39, 67, 140. 
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autonomy by criticizing U.S. welfare programs.
153
  He shows that the 
contrast between autonomy and dependency, which prevails under the 
liberal conception of personal autonomy, results in inadequate welfare 
programs.  Such programs aim at reducing the recipients’ dependency on 
the state and promoting their independence by cutting their financial 
support and encouraging them to find a job.  Such policies, however, as 
Christman argues, although allegedly constructed to promote the recipients’ 
autonomy, actually infringe it.  Leaving the welfare recipients to cope alone 
with the lack of income makes it harder for them to develop their 
autonomy.  An alternative, relational construction of welfare programs, 
according to Christman, should be based on the dependency of the 
recipients, and promote their autonomy through it.  Mainly, he calls for 
combining direct financial support with active personal assistance in the 
process of finding a job.  Active personal assistance creates opportunities 
for constructive relations, specifically for conducting joint deliberative 
reflective processes.  Designing welfare programs in a deliberative and 
reflective manner can raise the recipients’ confidence and self-esteem and 
provide them with opportunities to practice autonomy with professional, 
relational assistance.  Such reforms are more likely to enhance the 
recipients’ autonomy than independence-based ones. 
Another interesting example of state-fostered constructive relationships 
through which one’s personal autonomy can thrive is an Israeli case where 
it was necessary to appoint a guardian for an incapable woman.
154
  In the 
this case, which concerned a seventy-eight-year-old woman suffering from 
occasional episodes of dementia, a family court judge decided not to 
appoint her a regular guardian.  Instead, a good friend of hers was 
appointed as a “decision-making supporter.”
155
  By appointing a decision-
making supporter the family court promoted the woman’s autonomy 
through her dependence on her friend, while avoiding the paternalistic 
nature of guardianship.  It enabled the woman to continue navigating her 
own life, while being assisted and accompanied for this purpose.  It leaned 
on the constructive relationship between both women, gave it legal 
                                                          
 153.  Christman, supra note 66. 
 154.  Guardianship Case 43640-01-15 Doe v. N. County Gen. Admin. (Apr. 8, 2015) 
(unpublished) (Isr.).  
 155.  The judge mentioned that the decision-making supporter conforms to the U.N. 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2006). Although the 
relationship between both women existed before it was legally acknowledged, I 
consider it to be state-fostered, as this official appointment has a substantial impact on 
both women’s legal authorization in several contexts. For an analysis of the decision-
making supporter model, see Nina A. Kohn, Jeremy A. Blumenthal & Amy T. 
Campbell, Supported Decision-Making: A Viable Alternative to Guardianship, 117 
PENN. ST. L. REV. 1111 (2012). 
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recognition, and enabled the women to strengthen their relationship and its 
constructiveness even more, thus enhancing the personal autonomy of both 
of them.  About a year after this case, the Israeli Parliament amended the 
Legal Capacity and Guardianship Act by formally adding the option to 
appoint a decision-making supporter instead of a regular guardian.
156
 
There are several ways, then, in which the state can provide its citizens 
with constructive relationships through which their autonomy can thrive.  
In keeping with the relational approach, however, I am very careful not to 
romanticize relationships, nor to assume that the state’s power to provide 
constructive relationships is unlimited.  Paternalism, oppression and 
exploitation might characterize the relationships provided by the state, even 
when it makes an effort to formulate them as autonomy-enhancing 
relationships.  Moreover, the dynamic nature of relationships makes it 
rather difficult to regulate them, supervise them, or ensure that they are 
indeed constructive.  Nevertheless, ignoring the significance of 
constructive relationships and adhering solely to the liberal 
conceptualization of the right to autonomy might place much stricter limits 
on the ability to promote personal autonomy through legal and public 
policies.  Policymakers should consider both the strengths and possible 
flaws of the relational conceptualization of the right to personal autonomy 
when articulating this right in different contexts and cases. 
B. Relationships Within Private or Semi-Private Institutions 
Another kind of relationships that the state should ensure their 
constructiveness are those taking place within private or semi-private 
institutions, such as hospitals.  In the private and semi-private context, we 
should recall the dual duty of the state in promoting its citizens’ autonomy: 
the responsibility can be imposed directly on the state, as seen in the 
previous Section, or it can be placed on other entities, individuals and 
institutions.  In the latter case, the state’s responsibility is to articulate and 
enforce the rules that ensure that those institutions promote the citizens’ 
autonomy.  The case of informed consent serves as a good example of the 
second kind of state responsibility.  As discussed above, from a liberal 
point of view, obtaining one’s informed consent by clearly stressing the 
variety of possible treatments and letting her choose the most preferable 
option is perceived as enhancing one’s autonomy and fulfilling her right to 
personal autonomy.
157
  The duty imposed by the informed consent doctrine 
does not include, however, a duty to actively support the patient throughout 
                                                          
 156.  Legal Capacity and Guardianship Act (Amendment No. 18), 5776-2016, SH 
No. 2550 p. 798 (Isr.). 
 157.  See supra text accompanying notes 53-58. 
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the process of making her decision.  Although hospitals may do so 
voluntarily,
158
 the legal obligation requires only the disclosure of the full 
information needed for the consent to be informed.
159
 
There is no doubt, of course, that disclosing the full information is 
essential for the patient’s autonomy, but the relational approach would not 
find it sufficient.  The focus on information leans on the liberal assumption 
that once a patient has full information, she can independently, critically, 
and reflectively weigh all options and choose the one she prefers.  Such an 
assumption ignores the tremendous effect one’s bodily and emotional 
conditions have on her ability to conduct an independent process.
160
  
Contrarily, as discussed above, the relational approach rejects the notion of 
an internal decision-making process and points to the advantages of 
deliberative processes and to the integration of the body and emotions into 
the process.  Accordingly, under a relational conceptualization of the right 
to personal autonomy, the duty to obtain the patient’s informed consent 
should also include providing sufficient consultation and assistance in the 
process of decision-making.  More generally, a relational approach would 
emphasize the need for maintaining constructive relationships between the 
patients and the medical staff.  Constructive relationships and an assisted 
deliberative process not only improve the patient’s ability to reach an 
autonomous concrete decision, but also enhance her confidence in herself 
and in her caretakers, provide her with a chance to practice autonomous 
decision-making — and enhance her personal autonomy. 
Some scholars and courts have indeed advocated an expansion of the 
informed-consent doctrine to include a substantive dialogue between the 
patient and the physician.
161
  One legal scholar, Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, has 
                                                          
 158.  See, e.g., Erik Falkum & Reidun Førde, Paternalism, Patient Autonomy, and 
Moral Deliberation in the Physician-Patient Relationship: Attitudes Among Norwegian 
Physicians, 52 SOC. SCI. & MED. 239 (2001). 
 159.  See Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 12; Nadia N. Sawicki, Patient Protection and 
Decision-Aid Quality: Regulatory and Tort Law Approaches, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 621 
(2012) (“Unlike the traditional informed consent process, which is highly regulated and 
governed by decades of common law, the creation and use of decision-support tools is 
currently controlled only by market forces. No administrative regulations exist to 
delineate the appropriate scope of decision aids . . . .”). In Israel, see Patient’s Rights 
Law, § 13(b) (“For receiving an informed consent, the physician is required to deliver 
the patient the medical information needed for him to decide if he consents to the 
suggested treatment.”). 
 160.  And if not ignored, the bodily and emotional conditions might lead to 
justifying a paternalistic approach towards the patient. 
 161.  See Peter Shuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899, 903-04 
(1994) (referring to such advocators as “idealists,” as opposed to “realists” who 
highlight the barriers to and costs of expanding the informed-consent doctrine). 
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recently linked such a deliberative approach to informed consent to the 
relational conception of personal autonomy.
162
  However, her discussion 
focuses exclusively on reproductive decisions, related to abortions, fertility 
treatments, and medical care during pregnancy.  According to Laufer-
Ukeles, physicians’ deliberative assistance in the decision-making process 
is crucial for such decisions, since they are complex and involve significant 
identity-related aspects: the choice whether or not to become a mother, the 
preferred way of giving birth, etc. Laufer-Ukeles argues that for such 
decisions just the information on the various available options is not 
enough.
163
  Obviously, I agree with Laufer-Ukeles regarding the need to 
incorporate a duty to provide deliberative assistance into the informed-
consent doctrine.  However, I do not think that it should be restricted to 
reproductive decisions, nor to identity-related ones.  In my opinion, an 
assisted deliberative decision-making process is necessary for other 
substantial medical decisions as well, in order to promote patients’ 
autonomy.
164
  Such a contention has been voiced by philosopher Natalie 
Stoljar.
165
  Stoljar, like other philosophers who write on relational 
autonomy, does not articulate autonomy as a legal right, nor does she 
discuss the duty of the state to promote it.  Nonetheless, she does point out 
that the relational conception of autonomy highlights the insufficiency of 
information disclosure and the consequent need for an assisted deliberative 
process when making medical decisions. 
It bears mention that a duty to provide substantial deliberative decision-
making assistance for all (or most) patients is costly, and might impose a 
heavy (possibly too heavy) burden on hospitals and physicians.
166
  It might 
also make medical treatment more expensive and thus less accessible to the 
poor.  One possible reply to the budgetary challenge may be broadening the 
state’s responsibility to include not only the duty to formulate and enforce 
the legal rule, but also to subsidize — at least partially — its costs.
167
  
Another reply is that maintaining constructive relationships between 
                                                          
 162.  Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 12.  
 163.  Id. at 604, 606, 611 (criticizing especially the practice of providing such 
information via pamphlets). 
 164.  A big question is, of course, what are considered “substantial medical 
decisions.” This question should be debated and decided by policymakers.  
 165.  Stoljar, supra note 60. 
 166.  See Shuck, supra note 161. 
 167.  I find it important to emphasize again that this Article uses informed consent 
as an example, and does not aim at providing a thorough analysis of the doctrine. 
Future research should further develop the theoretical and practical connections 
between informed consent and the relational conception of personal autonomy, while 
discussing both the advantages and costs of conceptualizing informed consent in 
relational terms. 
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patients and hospital personnel most likely would lessen the chances of a 
hospital being sued.  Providing substantial deliberative decision-making 
assistance maintains constructive relationships between patients and 
hospital personnel.  This, in turn, mitigates costs, since more constructive 
relationships increase the ability to obtain genuine informed consent and 
reduce the likelihood of a patient filing a lawsuit.
168
  In other words, the 
costs of improving the constructiveness of the relationships in the hospitals 
and providing personal assistance in the process of decision-making might 
be balanced by a reduction in legal expenses, and can be covered, at least 
partially, by the state. 
C. The Prevention of Destructive Relationships 
A third aspect of the state’s duty to ensure that its citizens are provided 
with constructive relationships is the prevention of destructive ones.  A 
prominent example of the state’s duty is the prevention of violence in 
general, domestic violence in particular.  Domestic violence diminishes 
one’s autonomy in several ways: it impairs her bodily integrity, as well as 
her self-esteem and self-confidence; it deprives her of constructive relations 
within her own home; and it usually prevents her from developing 
alternative constructive relationships outside her home.
169
  Friedman further 
explains that violent relationships compel women to focus on their safety 
and survival,
170
 thus making it difficult for a woman to invest her cognitive 
and emotional resources in developing her personal autonomy and 
conducting autonomous reflective processes.  Moreover, according to 
Friedman, battered women — as a part of their efforts to survive — tend to 
prefer their spouses’ volitions and preferences, putting aside their own.
171
  
Such a preference impairs women’s autonomy in a way similar to 
manipulation and coercion, and causes their distinct personalities to merge 
within their spouses’ personalities.  Lastly, in many cases violent 
relationships enfold within them strict control and supervision by the men 
                                                          
 168.  See Kristin E. Schleiter, Difficult Patient-Physician Relationships and the Risk 
of Medical Malpractice Litigation, 11 AM. MED. ASS’N J. ETHICS 242, 242 (2009) 
(“The impact of poor communication skills increases the likelihood that patients with 
adverse outcomes will sue, whether or not an error has occurred.”). 
 169.  Since more women than men are abused by their spouses, my discussion in 
this Section focuses on women; nonetheless, it is applicable to male victims as well. On 
domestic violence against men, see, for example, PHILIP W. COOK, ABUSED MEN: THE 
HIDDEN SIDE OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (2009); Jamie R. Abrams, The Feminist Case for 
Acknowledging Women’s Acts of Violence, 27 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 287 (2016); and 
Christopher F. Barber, Domestic Violence Against Men, NURSING STANDARD, Aug. 27, 
2008, at 3. 
 170.  FRIEDMAN, supra note 10, at 142. 
 171.  Id. 
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over their wives’ lives. 
Most Western states acknowledge the severe problem of domestic 
violence and are engaged in developing legal and public policies to cope 
with it.  Nonetheless, as some relational scholars point out, such policies 
are usually of a paternalistic nature.
172
  Moreover, many policies involve 
taking the victim away from her home and community in order to protect 
her.  Although such protection is necessary, it can help the woman only 
partially in redeveloping her autonomy.  Contrarily, a relational articulation 
of the state’s duty in the context of facilitating a woman’s ability to 
redevelop her autonomy would also focus on the need to help the victim 
develop new constructive relationships or enhance the constructiveness of 
existing ones.
173
  For example, it would emphasize the need to provide her 
with a supporting network following her removal from her home, so she 
does not remain isolated.  Such a policy would improve her chances of 
restoring and enhancing her personal autonomy. 
An interesting example of the difference between relational and 
paternalistic policies regarding domestic violence is found in Nancy 
Fraser’s article from 1989 on the politicization of needs in general, 
women’s needs in particular.
174
  Fraser describes the establishment and 
management of shelters for battered women by feminist activists in the 
United States during the 1970s.  A few years after those shelters were 
established, the government and local municipalities acknowledged the 
problem and began funding and supporting the shelters.  The move toward 
funding was a remarkable feminist achievement, as it signaled the move 
from viewing domestic violence as a private issue to addressing it as a 
political, public phenomenon.  However, the governmental support, as 
described by Fraser, was accompanied by a sharp change in the way the 
shelters were run.  When feminist activists ran the shelters, major emphasis 
was placed on enhancing the constructive relationships between the tenants 
of the shelters and the shelters’ staff (some of the staff were women who 
themselves suffered from domestic violence).  In addition, an inherent part 
of the help given to women in the shelters was assistance in finding an 
alternative residence and workplace and in developing new, constructive 
networks of relationships.  Contrarily, under state funding and management 
of the shelters, a professional discourse took over, and a psychological, 
psychiatric, hierarchical, and paternalistic approach was implemented in 
the shelters.  Instead of helping women to thrive as a part of a community, 
                                                          
 172.  See, e.g., NEDELSKY, supra note 10, at 213. 
 173.  See id. at 213 (“If we are to stop violence against women we will have to think 
differently about the task of law and the state.”). 
 174.  Nancy Fraser, Talking About Needs: Interpretive Contests as Political 
Conflicts in Welfare-State Societies, 99 ETHICS 291, 308-10 (1989). 
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the shelters personnel treated women as therapeutic objects.  From a 
relational perspective, although such therapy may indeed be very helpful 
for reconstructing women’s lives, it is not enough for redeveloping and 
enhancing their personal autonomy. 
The contradiction described by Fraser, between the aspiration to 
redevelop women’s autonomy through constructive relationships and the 
paternalistic approach of the state, is central to our discussion on the state’s 
responsibility for the development of personal autonomy.  Specifically, it 
highlights the need to develop a public policy that is not based on a 
paternalistic approach towards battered women, but rather focuses on the 
need to enhance women’s autonomy.  The relational approach, which 
characterized the shelters when they were run by feminist activists, can also 
be implemented by the state.  The state can provide women with support 
systems, through which they can redevelop their autonomy, while 
establishing constructive — rather than paternalistic — relationships 
between the women and the state’s agents.  The state can also actively 
assist women in finding a new workplace and residence, enabling them to 
reconstruct their families and keep raising their children.  Lastly, it can 
enhance women’s economic autonomy by providing or subsidizing 
adequate programs to assist women.
175
  Those strategies can accompany 
(yet not replace) the policies that aim to protect women’s lives and safety. 
D. Addressing Coercive Socialization 
The need to deal with destructive relationships is also apparent in cases 
of coercive socialization.  The state’s role in this regard might be rather 
vague since, as explained above, there are no clear criteria for 
distinguishing between the oppressive (or coercive) and benign 
consequences of socialization.
176
  The state cannot — and should not — 
aim at eliminating all sorts and forms of socialization.  Any attempt to 
overcome all social and cultural influences is doomed to fail.  However, the 
relational account of personal autonomy does acknowledge that it might be 
difficult for a person to critically examine by herself the impacts and 
consequences of socialization, or resist them.  The state and its agents may 
be in a better (albeit not perfect) position to identify oppressive 
socialization in various contexts, address it or prevent it.  An interesting 
example is found in section 6C2 of the Israeli Equal Rights for Women 
Law, which requires legislators to consider the possible impacts of each bill 
                                                          
 175.  See, e.g., AMY CORREIA, PA. COAL. AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, 
STRATEGIES TO EXPAND BATTERED WOMEN’S ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES (2000), 
http://www.vawnet.org/Assoc_Files_VAWnet/BCS9_EO.pdf. 
 176.  See supra Section II.B. 
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on the social status of women.
177
  This section requires the state to prevent 
in advance at least some of the negative consequences of gender-related 
socialization in concrete contexts.  This, in turn, can help mitigating 
oppressive socialization in broader social contexts and eventually 
eliminating at lease some coercive social norms. 
Moreover, state authorities and institutions have the power to assist 
persons who are subjected to oppressive socialization to leave such 
relationships and develop alternative, constructive ones.  An apparent 
example is the case of conservative communities, which was discussed 
above.
178
  The state and its agents can assist individuals within such 
communities to decide whether they wish to stay or leave.  The state can 
also regulate, at least partially, the relationships within such communities, 
and enforce policies aimed at reducing the impacts of socialization, 
strengthening constructive relationships within the communities, and 
promoting the members’ personal autonomy.
179
  However, here as well, it 
bears emphasis that the power of the state is limited.  Some communities 
and cultural groups are too conservative and segregated for the state to be 
able to deal with the powerful socialization within them.  It is also 
extremely difficult to regulate the relationships within such communities 




It should be noted that not all policymakers would be willing to reject 
policies and laws that might have such problematic consequences or to 
regulate relationships within segregated communities.  There are various 
reasons for such unwillingness: identification with conservative 
perceptions, political considerations, an inability to confront powerful 
social groups and actors, etc.  In fact, the state itself serves in many cases 
as a prominent agent of coercive socialization.  Such is, for example, the 
limitations placed upon women’s right to have an abortion.  Recent 
legislative developments in some U.S. states (as the 2013 Texas regulation 
on abortion clinics) restrict the availability of abortions for many women. 
Such policies infringe women’s autonomy, both by narrowing their variety 
of options (i.e., to abort or to keep the pregnancy) and by strengthening the 
social conception of motherhood as women’s primary social role.  At the 
                                                          
 177.  Equal Rights for Women Law, 5711-1951, § 6C2, 5 LSI 171 (as amended) 
(Isr.). 
 178.  See supra Section II.B. 
 179.  Another example, which I intend to develop in future papers, is regulating the 
relationships between spouses in a manner that encourages the promotion of their 
constructive relationships and consequently of their personal autonomy within the 
family. 
 180.  See AYELET SHACHAR, MULTICULTURAL JURISDICTION (2001). 
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same time, as explained by Laufer-Ukeles, from a relational point of view, 
at least some policies that are considered pro-life and anti-abortion (such as 
the duty to consult) can actually promote women’s autonomy, if 
implemented correctly.
181
  I intend to further develop the relational 
discussion on abortions in another paper.  What the current discussion has 
made clear, however, is the need to pay careful attention to the 
relationships between the state and the individuals whose autonomy it has a 
responsibility to promote. 
E. A Possible Critique: Autonomous Individuals and the State 
The previous Sections address several aspects of a state’s responsibility 
to promote its citizens’ personal autonomy.  We have seen that on the one 
hand, the state can promote constructive relationships among individuals, 
as well as between individuals and public or semi-public institutions.  It can 
also prevent destructive relationships and address the influence of coercive 
socialization.  On the other hand, we have also seen that the state itself can 
be the source of paternalistic (or even destructive) relationships, and serve 
as an agent of coercive socialization.  Moreover, charging the state with a 
responsibility to promote individuals’ autonomy — specifically the 
responsibility for the constructive relationships in people’s lives — raises 
the concern of massive state intervention within the private sphere.  The 
juxtaposition of the potential for paternalistic and coercive relations 
between the state and its citizens and the concern of massive intervention 
leads to a possible critique of the policy set forth in this Article: that it 
would eventually infringe people’s autonomy instead of enhancing it. 
This concern is not unjustified.  Nedelsky herself admits that a relational 
articulation of legal rights and rules might indeed lead to the expansion of 
the state’s presence in private lives and strengthen the coercive power of 
the collective over the individual.
182
  Nedelsky ties this possible critique to 
another one: the risks that may emerge from forgoing the concept of 
borders.  According to Nedelsky, rights and legal rules should be 
formulated and conceptualized in terms of relationships rather than borders.  
In many instances, however, such borders seem to be crucial, as in the case 
                                                          
 181.  Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 12, at 591; cf. CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT 
VOICE ch. 2 (1982) (arguing that the individualistic conception of women’s decision-
making process regarding abortions misconceives the way women actually make such a 
decision; and, more significantly, that an individualistic, either/or conception of that 
process results in women perceiving themselves as either selfish or victims, rather than 
autonomous agents). 
 182.  NEDELSKY, supra note 10, at 202. As emphasized by her and by other 
relational scholars, besides the importance of relationships for one’s autonomy, an 
individual also needs to be protected from a possible collective coercive power. Id. at 
86. 
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of legal rules aimed at protecting people from violence.  In the relational 
framework context, Nedelsky points to an inherent contradiction between 
the relational conception of autonomy and the feminist intuition, which 
highlights the importance of borders for maintaining people’s — especially 
women’s — safety.  Through the example of violence against women, 
Nedelsky examines both possible critiques: the risks of forgoing the 




Nedelsky analyses the policies of liberal states regarding violence 
against women (domestic violence as well as other forms of violence), and 
shows that liberal legal policies that are based on the concept of borders 
and aim to create a separation between victims and their victimizers have 
failed to protect women.  This failure is attributable, inter alia, to the fact 
that in many cases the violence constitutes a part of the relationships within 
which women are embedded.  Therefore, the attempt to distance the victims 
from the source of the violence is mostly inefficient — and sometimes even 
impossible.  As an alternative, Nedelsky suggests that the relevant legal 
rules should be formulated in relational terms, focusing on the 
constructiveness of the relationships between men and women and not on 
the borders between them.  Leaning on the example of revisions made in 
the Canadian law dealing with sexual assaults,
184
 she shows that 
formulating rules on the basis of equal and respectful relationships is more 
likely to lead to the enhancement of women’s safety and the prevention of 
violent relationships than formulating those rules in terms of borders. 
Nedelsky’s conclusion is twofold.  First, she resolves the alleged 
contradiction between the relational approach and feminist intuition with 
regard to the concept of borders by showing that borders have failed to 
serve as an adequate framework for protecting women from violence.  
Second, and more importantly for our discussion, Nedelsky shows that the 
relational conception does not inherently lead to the expansion of the 
state’s presence in individuals’ lives, but rather merely changes the way the 
state acts within the private sphere.  Instead of setting borders, the state can 
regulate relationships; either way, the state is already present in all 
individuals’ lives.  Moreover, Nedelsky’s discussion leads to another 
conclusion: that the liberal approach as well — and not just the relational 
one — in fact formulates the relationships between individuals.  In other 
words, the difference between the liberal conceptualization of legal rules 
and the relational one lies not in the extent of the state’s presence within 
the private sphere, but rather in the nature of the relationships each 
                                                          
 183.  Id. at 200-30. 
 184.  See id. at 218-21. 
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promotes.  While the liberal approach mostly focuses on the borders 
between individuals,
185
 the relational one focuses on the constructiveness of 
the relationships between them. 
I would add to Nedelsky’s conclusion another important layer, which is 
not discussed in her work: regarding the border between the state and the 
individuals.  While Nedelsky rejects the concept of borders between 
individuals, she does not discuss the borders between individuals and the 
state.  The liberal approach justifies state interventions within the family, 
but only to a certain extent, especially when an individual’s liberty causes 
harm to another individual’s liberty.
186
  Liberals justify placing 
responsibility on the state to enforce equality and rights within the family, 
intervene in what is conceived as pathological (such as rape and violence in 
the family
187
), implement welfare policies,
188
 and so on.  Therefore, both 
liberal and relational approaches acknowledge the legitimacy of state’s 
involvement in people’s lives. 
However, there is an inherent difference between the liberal and 
relational conceptualization of state’s intervention in the private sphere. 
Liberals insist on drawing a clear line between individuals and the state, 
thus limiting the latter’s intervention in people’s lives.  Where the line 
between individuals and the state is located, according to John Stuart Mill, 
is one of the most fundamental questions in liberal theory,
189
 and has not 
                                                          
 185.  But see Dagan and Dorfman’s liberal account of relational justice, supra note 
51 and accompanying text. 
 186.  In this respect, liberals differ from libertarians, who advocate minimizing the 
state’s intervention in the private sphere as much as possible. See, e.g., ROBERT 
NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974). For a critique on the libertarian notion 
of state nonintervention, see, for example, Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of 
Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73 (1985) (arguing that it is the state’s regulation that 
determines the right to possess, i.e., that even when it seems, from a libertarian point of 
view, that the state does not intervene, its power over people’s lives is constant). 
Another set of critiques of the notion of state nonintervention is found in feminist 
scholarship on the distinction between the private and the public, specifically on the 
family. See, e.g., Frances E. Olsen, Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 835 (1984) (arguing that the state’s alleged “nonintervention” in 
the family is no less active than its “intervention,” since it constitutes an active decision 
to maintain the hierarchal, sometimes destructive, power relations within the family). 
 187.  Note that the definition of “pathological” is constantly changing. Not too many 
years ago a wife’s rape by her husband and domestic violence were not considered to 
justify state intervention. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating 
as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117 (1996). 
 188.  The implementation of welfare policies in the family is considered to justify 
enhanced state intervention in the family. See Kaaryn Gustafson, The Criminalization 
of Poverty, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 643 (2009). 
 189.  MILL, supra note 21, at 3-4. 
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been solved to this day.  Conversely, the relational approach enables us to 
rethink the concept of the border between the state and individuals.  Instead 
of focusing on the border and trying to determine its appropriate location, 
the relational theory turns the spotlight on the relationships between the 
state and individuals.  The state is not a monolithic entity, whose reach 
terminates at a certain spot; rather, relationships between the state and 
individuals are complex and dynamic.  Therefore, the “border” between the 
state and the individuals is in fact a fiction.  To be clear: I do not contend 
that there is no distinction between the private and public sphere; I merely 
suggest that the terminology of borders is inadequate for describing and 
prescribing the relations between both spheres.
190
  The state is an inherent 
part of the network of relationships that persons are embedded in, and at 
the same time, it is responsible for the relationships that constitute this 
network.  Moreover, the relationships between the state and individuals 
enhance people’s personal autonomy in some respects, but infringe it in 
other respects.  The complexity of the relationships between individuals 
and the state, which is revealed through the relational theory, leads to the 
conclusion that the fundamental question with regard to the state’s power 
within the private sphere should not be where do we draw the line between 
the state and individuals, but rather how constructive are the relationships 
between the state and individuals. 
Consequently, it does not suffice to examine the ways that legal rules 
formulate the relationships among individuals; the relationships between 
the state and individuals should be scrutinized as well.  It is extremely 
crucial, for instance, to identify the cases in which the state enhances 
coercive socialization and reformulate the relationships between the state 
and individuals in such cases, so they enhance people’s personal autonomy 
instead of infringing it.  The solution to possible coercion and paternalism 
by the state is not found in the retreat of the state from individuals’ lives. 
This solution is infeasible, since the state is inherently present in them.  It 
might also be harmful, since, as we have seen in the previous sections, the 
state has a major and active role in promoting people’s personal autonomy.  
Rather, the solution is to identify the cases in which the relationships 
between the state and individuals are not constructive enough (or even 
destructive), and enhance their constructiveness. 
To sum, the discussion in this short Section provides two preliminary 
replies to the concern that the relational conceptualization of the right to 
personal autonomy would enhance the state’s involvement in individuals’ 
                                                          
 190.  For other, contemporary discussions on the fluidity and complexity of the 
public-private distinction, see, for example, Dagan & Dorfman, supra note 51, at 1424-
30; and Hila Shamir, The Public/Private Distinction Now: The Challenges of 
Privatization and of the Regulatory State, 15 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 1 (2014). 
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lives.  First, as Nedelsky shows, what matters is not the extent that the state 
is involved, but rather the way it formulates the relationships among 
individuals.  Second, as I argue, it is no less important to address the 
constructiveness of the relationships between individuals and the state.  
Both replies not only diminish the fear of the state’s involvement in the 
promotion of people’s autonomy, but also provide a new framework for 
thinking about the distinction between the private and the public.  A 
relational discussion in the context of states duties should be further 
developed in the future. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
This Article lays preliminary foundations for a relational 
conceptualization of the right to personal autonomy.  It leans in part on the 
liberal attempt to articulate such a right, unveils the substantial limitations 
of the liberal conception of autonomy for this task, and turns to the 
relational conception of personal autonomy as a more adequate ground for 
the articulation of the right to personal autonomy.  The aim of this Article 
thus was to explore the potential of the relational conception to serve as a 
basis for the legal right to personal autonomy, and begin conceptualizing 
the right itself.  It did so by introducing three aspects of state responsibility 
— namely, providing constructive relationships, ensuring the 
constructiveness of existing relationships, and preventing destructive 
relationships.  Each aspect is relevant to relationships that are provided by 
the state, as well as relationships between individuals and institutions and 
among individuals.  The state has a duty to ensure the existence of 
constructive relationships in people’s lives, as well as a duty to initiate and 
encourage deliberative autonomy-enhancing processes of decision-making. 
It should be emphasized that these duties of the state do not replace the 
duty to expand the citizens’ variety of options in various contexts — a duty 
that is based on the liberal conceptualization of the right to personal 
autonomy.  Rather, both kinds of duties supplement each other.  Together, 
the duties discussed in this Article begin to provide a clearer definition of 
the right to personal autonomy, thus overcoming some of its current 
vagueness in legal discourse. 
Obviously, it has not been my intention in this Article to provide a full 
articulation of the right to personal autonomy, but merely to highlight the 
need for its renewed, relational conceptualization, and set its foundations.  
The aspects of state responsibility discussed above should be further 
developed in future research, inter alia, by delving into specific issues in 
various contexts.  In another part of my research, for example, I focus on 
the articulation of the right to personal autonomy within the family, 
specifically with regard to the management of marital property.  Another 
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relevant context for future advancement of the right to personal autonomy 
is the doctrine of informed consent, which was briefly addressed in some 
parts of this Article.  Many aspects of the debate on the autonomy of 
women in the context of abortions should also be discussed in light of the 
relational conceptualization of the right to personal autonomy, and can shed 
important light on the articulation of such a right.  To conclude, much work 
has yet to be done in order to thoroughly and adequately articulate the right 
to personal autonomy; hopefully, the ideas set forth in this Article can serve 
as a starting point for this task. 
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